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PER SE BAD FAITH? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GOOD
FAITH IN CHAPTER 13 FEE-ONLY PLANS
ABSTRACT
Section 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires chapter 13 plans to be
“proposed in good faith and not by any means prevented by law.”
Section 1325(a)(7) requires that “the action of the debtor in filing the petition
was in good faith.” Courts evaluate both good faith provisions through a
subjective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances in each case, typically
using similar factors in the analysis. Many jurisdictions provide a list of
factors for this assessment. Courts caution that any list is non-exhaustive and
should not limit the subjective nature of the good faith inquiry. Some chapter
13 plans propose to pay little more than the trustee and attorney fees, and
leave nothing or a nominal repayment to general unsecured creditors. These
so-called “fee-only” plans challenge one of the underlying goals of chapter
13: a fair distribution of the debtor’s future income to repay creditors. While
courts find most fee-only plans fail to satisfy the good faith requirements, three
circuit courts have ruled that fee-only plans are not per se bad faith.
This Comment provides insight into how courts are actually dealing with
fee-only cases through an empirical study of good faith litigation over plans
proposing zero or a nominal repayment to general unsecured creditors. This
study compiles data and conducts a broad analysis of the factors that courts
have listed and discussed in the totality of the circumstances test for good
faith. This Comment hypothesizes that two particular variables are significant
predictors of a court’s ruling on good faith: (1) the repayment to general
unsecured creditors and (2) the number of factors discussed in the case.
Analysis of the data does not support the first hypothesis but does support the
second. This Comment concludes that, in the absence of a strong correlation
between the number of factors and good faith rulings, courts should not
overhaul the traditional good faith analysis when dealing with fee-only plans.
This Comment suggests, however, one of the circuit court rulings may provide
a modified approach that balances the benefits of a subjective, discretionary
standard against the wide-ranging concern over plans that propose little or no
repayment to general unsecured creditors.
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INTRODUCTION
“I am not going to allow these folks to come in here and pay lawyers,”
proclaimed the bankruptcy judge.1 The judge had been curious why, other than
an inability to pay the attorney fee up front, the debtor wished to file for
chapter 13 relief instead of chapter 7.2 The attorney replied, “Well, the reason
he wants to is because he wants some relief and he can't get it with a [c]hapter
7 because he has no money.”3 But the judge replied, “And he has no money to,
you have to finish the sentence, pay his lawyer.”4
The judge suggested that the debtor need only save his proposed chapter 13
payment for a few months, and then pay the attorney for a chapter 7 filing.5
But for ethical reasons, the judge would not allow debtors to file for chapter 13
relief merely to finance their attorney fees.6 If debtors cannot afford the fee up
front, the judge explained, “I don't see how in the world you expect that they
are going to be able to pay a five or three-year plan and not default and then,
once they do, they are back in the soup again and they have made no
headway.”7
This exchange highlights the problems in chapter 13 bankruptcy with socalled “fee-only” plans, which propose to pay the debtor’s attorney fees
through plan payments while leaving nothing or a nominal amount to general
unsecured creditors.8 In this case, as with many fee-only plans, the judge
denied confirmation of the plan because it violated chapter 13’s good faith
provisions under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3) and 1325(a)(7).9
When it enacted the modern Bankruptcy Code (Code),10 Congress included
§ 1325(a)(3), an ambiguous confirmation requirement that “the plan has been
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”11

1 Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting from the transcript of the bankruptcy court’s confirmation hearing in the case).
2 Id. at 1312.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1312.
6 Id. at 1313.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2012).
9 Brown, 742 F.3d at 1313.
10 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at title 11 of
the United States Code).
11 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2012).
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Unsurprisingly, the good faith standard spurred litigation.12 In 2005, Congress
added § 1325(a)(7),13 another confirmation requirement that “the action of the
debtor in filing the petition was in good faith.”14 In assessing good faith under
both provisions, courts typically apply a totality of the circumstances test,
which requires a fact-intensive inquiry in each case.15 Various lists of factors
have emerged as a result, though courts acknowledge that these lists are not
exhaustive.16
Although the Code only requires general unsecured creditors in chapter 13
to receive at least as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7
liquidation,17 fee-only plans nevertheless challenge one of chapter 13’s
primary goals: to distribute a debtor’s future income to repay creditors in lieu
of liquidating the debtor’s assets.18 As one court explained, “[c]hapter 13 is
titled ‘Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income.’ [With feeonly plans, debtors] are not adjusting anything, much less debt; they are
canceling and eliminating the claims of creditors while simply paying their
attorneys.”19
“Fee-only” and other court-coined terms for these plans do not have a
concrete definition.20 Regardless of the terminology, fee-only plans uniformly
allow debtors the benefits of retaining their assets and financing their legal fees
through a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan while offering little or nothing in return
to general unsecured creditors.21 Three federal circuit courts have rejected the
view that fee-only plans are bad faith per se.22 Though in one of the opinions,
Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), the First Circuit seems to narrow their

12 Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 439, 448 & n.47 (1997) (citing Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter 13 “Good Faith” Tempest: An Analysis and
Proposal For Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 273 (1981)) (identifying at least 53 cases through 1981 and
approximately 700 cases from 1981 to 1996 that litigated the chapter 13 good faith standard).
13 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
sec. 102(g)(3), § 1325(a), 119 Stat. 23, 33 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)).
14 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7) (emphasis added).
15 See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012).
16 See Elbein, supra note 12, at 454 (providing a list of consensus factors among courts, but also noting
courts interpret the standard loosely and do not articulate exhaustive lists).
17 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
18 See In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980).
19 In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008).
20 See infra Part II.A.
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014); Puffer, 674 F.3d at 85, 87–88;
Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675–76 (5th Cir. 2012).
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treatment of fee-only plans within the totality of the circumstances test.23 No
other circuits have definitively addressed the issue, and lower courts have
taken various approaches.24
Regardless of the approach, and despite the appellate courts’ unwillingness
to adopt a per se rule so far, courts invariably view fee-only plans with a great
deal of suspicion; as one court explained, “a heavy burden of proof” is required
to rule that fee-only plans comply with chapter 13’s good faith requirements.25
Although the Code doesn’t necessarily require any repayment to unsecured
creditors in chapter 13,26 courts seem to acknowledge that something is
inherently wrong with a chapter 13 plan that only exists to finance attorney
(and court) fees.27 Where chapter 13 exists to allow debtors to repay debts
through future income when they are able to do so,28 fee-only plans appear to
be “little more than disguised [c]hapter 7 proceedings.”29 Perhaps this is the
perfect place to examine the line between good faith and bad. When a chapter
13 plan offers no more repayment to general unsecured creditors than a chapter
7 liquidation, should courts adopt a per se rule against fee-only plans, or at
least modify the totality of the circumstances test for good faith? Are any
particular factors within the totality of the circumstances test more significant
than others?
This Comment addresses these questions by conducting an empirical
analysis of chapter 13 fee-only plans, specifically the factors courts list and
discuss in the totality of the circumstances test for good faith. This analysis
provides insight on the actual application of those factors within the specific
context of fee-only plans, and determines whether courts are indeed trending
toward common considerations in ruling on good faith. To the author’s
knowledge, the factors have not been studied empirically, and certainly not
23

Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012). See infra Part II.B.1.
Puffer, 674 F.3d at 79. See also In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *9–12 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) (also noting that while fee-only plans might be more susceptible to a finding of bad
faith, courts continue to determine good faith on a case-by-case basis in lieu of a per se rule against fee-only
plans).
25 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *10 (citing Puffer, 674 F.3d at 79; In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2011)).
26 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 43 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Parts I.B.2 and II.
28 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
29 Arlen, 461 B.R. at 555 (also noting that a fee-only plan “blurs the distinctions between [chapters 7 and
13] and the various differences in their scope . . .” (citing In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59–60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
2008)).
24
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with a focus on fee-only plans. Empirical research can provide valuable insight
in consumer bankruptcy.30 This Comment only provides a rough sketch of how
courts are actually applying the good faith standard within the specific context
of fee-only plans. While the totality of the circumstances test is subjective, the
factors courts list offer a hook for which an empirical study can examine the
test.
In light of three recent circuit court decisions, this study offers insight on
whether courts are focusing their good faith analysis in fee-only cases with any
statistical significance. Conducting this analysis will help inform courts
whether the traditional good faith test should be modified in the context of feeonly plans.
Part I provides relevant background discussion of chapter 13 and the
evolution of its good faith standard. Part II dissects the concept of “fee-only,”
defines its scope for purposes of this study, and discusses the three circuit court
decisions that have definitively ruled on the validity of fee-only plans.
Part III first discusses the empirical study’s method, assumptions and
limitations, and the list of good faith factors. It then presents the results of the
analysis. The study found no statistically significant relationship between the
percentage of repayment to general unsecured creditors and a good faith
finding. The findings, however, did reveal a few statistically significant
relationships: (1) within the totality of the circumstances test, as the difference
between the number of factors a court discusses and the number of factors a
court lists increases, the likelihood that a court finds the plan to be in good
faith decreases; (2) one factor’s listing and one other factor’s discussion are
statistically significant predictors of a good faith finding; and (3) four pairs of
factors are discussed in the same case at statistically significant rates.
Part IV discusses the overall implications of the study’s results and offers
options moving forward, including a discussion of a modified approach to feeonly plans, which would require special circumstances to justify the plan under
11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3) and 1325(a)(7). This approach is derived from one
possible interpretation of Puffer.31

30 See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 2123 (2002).
31 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012). See infra Part II.B.1.
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I. BACKGROUND
Part I.A. provides an overview and history of chapter 13, including the
contrast between its intended purpose and how debtors actually use it. Part I.B.
then discusses the pros and cons of chapter 13 compared to chapter 7, with
particular attention to attorney fees and how fee-only plans challenge the
underlying purpose of chapter 13. Part I.C. then traces the development of
chapter 13’s good faith provisions, including courts’ listing of factors to
consider in the totality of the circumstances test for good faith, on which this
empirical study is based.
A. Chapter 13 History and Purpose: The Rosy Vision
Entitled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,”
chapter 13 offers consumer debtors an alternative to chapter 7 liquidation.32
While the goals of both chapters are to provide a “fresh start” for the debtor
and to secure a fair repayment to creditors,33 each chapter’s method for
reaching those goals is different. In chapter 7 the trustee liquidates the debtor’s
non-exempt assets that are property of the bankruptcy estate and uses the
proceeds to pay creditors’ claims.34 Chapter 13, however, allows a debtor to
repay creditors with future income over a given period of time under court
supervision.35 With the adoption of the “means test” in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),36 Congress
made clear that chapter 13 should be a system where “debtors who can pay
creditors do pay them.”37 Fee-only plans call into question whether a supposed
32

11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012).
See Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that one purpose of the
Code is to provide “evenhanded treatment” to creditors); In re Hageney, 422 B.R. 254, 259 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 2009) (“[The] commencement of a bankruptcy case under any chapter of the [] Code must be consistent
with bankruptcy policy, and with [the] goal of providing a fresh start to honest but unfortunate debtors while
maximizing repayment to creditors.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6078 (stating a goal of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is to provide debtors with a fresh start).
34 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (listing the exemptions to property of the bankruptcy estate); id. § 541 (setting for
the creation and contents of the bankruptcy estate); id. § 704(a)(1) (“The trustee shall—collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate . . . .”); id. §§ 725–726 (setting forth the order in which the trustee shall
distribute the liquidated property of the estate).
35 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118.
36 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h), 119
Stat. 23, 33–34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)). Chapter 13 incorporates the chapter 7 means test
for above-median-income debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3).
37 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011) (describing the intent behind both
chapter 7 and chapter 13 using the means test, which seeks to force can-pay debtors out of chapter 7 and is part
of the repayment calculus for above-median debtors in chapter 13).
33
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can-pay debtor is doing anything but “canceling and eliminating the claims of
creditors while simply paying their attorneys.”38
Chapter 13 under the modern Code39 replaced “Chapter XIII—Wage
Earners’ Plans” from the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.40 Chapter 13 eliminated
chapter XIII’s requirement that all creditors consent to the plan.41 By removing
the consent requirement, the drafters intended to provide the debtor with more
realistic repayment terms that took the debtor’s circumstances and ability to
repay into consideration.42 While the “best interests of creditors” test in
§ 1325(a)(4)—which ensures unsecured creditors do not receive less than they
would in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation43—set the repayment floor, the
legislative history indicates Congress expected chapter 13 debtors would repay
more. The House Report noted, “Creditors will not be disadvantaged [under
the new chapter 13], because the plan must still pay them more than they
would get under a liquidation.”44 The Senate Report also suggests that the
drafters did not intend for repayment under the new chapter 13 plans to equal
merely the liquidation value.45 Nevertheless, courts wrestled with this very
issue in early cases litigating good faith in chapter 13.46
Congress indeed had a rosy vision of the new chapter 13 and its perceived
benefits to debtors—namely, higher postbankruptcy credit worthiness than a
38

In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1330 (2012)).
40 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. XIII, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (repealed 1978).
41 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 123. The consent requirement posed a significant barrier for debtors
proposing a “composition plan,” one that provides less than full repayment, as creditors typically only
consented to an “extension plan,” one that repaid debts in full. See, e.g., Richard E. Flint, Consumer
Bankruptcy Policy: Ability to Pay and Catholic Social Teaching, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 346–72 (2011)
(providing a history of composition and extension plans in bankruptcy law).
42 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 123–24.
43 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). This provision is widely known as the “best interests of creditors test.” See,
e.g., Susan A. Schneider, Bankruptcy Reform and Family Famers: Correcting the Disposable Income
Problem, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 309, 316 (2006).
44 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 124 (emphasis added). It is unclear what the House meant by this statement
given that § 1325(a)(4) was in unaltered existence at the time of the report. Perhaps stating “more than” was in
recognition of the test requiring chapter 13 creditors to receive a higher total dollar amount to account for the
present value of a chapter 7 repayment. See id. at 408 (stating that the phrase, “‘[v]alue, as of the effective date
of the plan,’ as used in . . . proposed 11 U.S.C. . . . 1325(a)(4) . . . indicates that the promised payment under
the plan must be discounted to present value as of the effective date of the plan”).
45 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799 (“The [chapter 7
discharge limitation] will also . . . prevent chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition plans
under which payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of the debtor.”).
46 Infra Part I.C.1.
39
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chapter 7 debtor, and a feeling of pride upon successful completion of the plan,
particularly when it pays creditors in full.47 The reality, however, has been less
rosy. Chapter 13 plans often appear on the opposite side of the repayment
spectrum, as debtors attempt to leave general unsecured creditors emptyhanded while creatively deducting expenses such as flat-screen televisions with
surround-sound systems48 and vacation timeshares.49 Very few plans propose
anything close to full repayment to creditors.50 Credit advantages for chapter
13 over chapter 7 are almost non-existent; in fact, one study even suggests that
chapter 7 debtors have the advantage.51 And nearly two-thirds of all chapter 13
debtors fail to complete the plan and receive a discharge.52
B. Chapter 13 v. Chapter 7: The Tensions That Fee-Only Plans Highlight
1. The Pros and Cons of Chapter 13
Chapter 13 some benefits over chapter 7, and three will be discussed here.
First, a chapter 13 debtor may retain all of his pre-bankruptcy assets—they are
not used to satisfy creditors’ claims.53 Second, the discharge provisions in
chapter 13 are more generous than chapter 7, but the so-called
“superdischarge” has eroded over time with Code amendments, especially
BAPCPA.54 Third, chapter 13 debtors may pay attorney fees over the duration
47 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
48 In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 567–68 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
49 In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL 2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012).
50 See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13,
39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 477 (2006) (finding that, in a study of seven districts, “nearly 45% of the cases in
which a proposed repayment was reported proposed to pay no more than 25%”).
51 See Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy
Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1408–10 (2007). Porter’s study found that chapter 7 debtors are significantly
more likely than chapter 13 debtors to receive credit offers, particularly secured credit, after filing bankruptcy.
Id. Porter notes, “[o]verall, lenders exhibit a customer preference for [c]hapter 7 filers over [c]hapter 13
filers . . . . Despite [the lending industry’s] rhetoric championing [c]hapter 13 as the ‘honorable’ path for
families in serious financial trouble . . . .” Id. at 1410–11. Also, both chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings may stay
on a debtor’s credit report for the same amount of time. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
52 John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability
and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1144 & n.80 (citing three studies from 1989, 2001, and
2006, all of which found that approximately one-third or less of chapter 13 filings result in plan completion
and discharge).
53 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118.
54 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 314(b),
199 Stat. 23, 88 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1328) (amending § 1328(a) to expand the list of nondischargeable debts in chapter 13); In re Platt, No. 12-6170-13, 2012 WL 5842899, at *2 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
Nov. 19, 2012) (summarizing BAPCPA’s effect on the “super discharge”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at
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of the plan, as opposed to paying the fees upon filing in chapter 7.55 Whether
up-front payment for a chapter 7 filing is impossible or merely less desirable,
deferring fee payments can be a powerful motivator for a debtor to choose
chapter 13 over chapter 7.56 Although debtors always have the option to
proceed pro se, studies show that debtors with legal representation tend to have
a much higher success rate in bankruptcy proceedings than pro se filers.57
Despite the benefits, chapter 13 also has its costs, two of which will be
discussed here. First, whereas chapter 7 debtors benefit from a swift discharge,
which typically occurs within a few months of filing a petition,58 chapter 13
debtors remain under court supervision for the entire duration of the plan,
typically three to five years.59 It is only after the trustee receives the last

76–77 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 144 (outlining BAPCPA’s amendments to nondischargeable debts in § 1328(a)); Larry A. Pittman II & Jeffrey A. Deines, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform, J. KAN. B.A., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 20, 22 (describing how BAPCPA virtually eliminated
the chapter 13 “super discharge”).
55 See infra note 202.
56 See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 349, 380 & n.174 (2008) (noting that “for chapter 13 debtors at or below median income and probably
for nearly all chapter 13 debtors, what drives them into chapter 13 is not failing the presumed abuse means
test, but . . . such considerations as . . . paying attorneys fees over time . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Lois R.
Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 47, 49 n.120
(2012) (noting that in chapter 7 no-asset cases—which are a vast majority of chapter 7 filings according to
Table 2 at page 47—attorneys rarely agree to accept a portion of their fee after filing the petition). But see
generally David E. Frisvold & Sharron B. Lane, Attorney’s Fees in Chapter 13: Do They Influence Chapter
Choice?, 2003 No. 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (finding no statistically significant relationship between
the amount of attorney’s fees and the percentage of chapter 13 filings, as between chapter 7 and chapter 13,
and concluding the fees may not be the source of influence in chapter selection as some have suggested).
57 See Lupica, supra note 56, at 81 (“Post-BAPCPA, 100% of [pro se] cases were filed under chapter 13
with a petition preparer’s assistance. Not one of the post-BAPCPA cases filed with the assistance of a petition
preparer ended in the debtor receiving a discharge.”); Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to
Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 22–23 (2009) (in a sample of over 85,000
chapter 7 cases, finding that the dismissal rate for pro se debtors was 6.4%, compared to only 0.9% of
represented debtors).
58 Amy Y. Landry & Robert J. Landry, III, Medical Bankruptcy Reform: A Fallacy of Composition, 19
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151, 166 nn.91 & 93 (2011); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c), 4007(c) (2012)
(setting time limits for objections to discharge in chapter 7 cases, and providing upon expiration of these
limits, “the court shall forthwith grant the discharge”).
59 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4). The required plan duration, or “applicable commitment period,” is either three
years or not less than five years, depending on the debtor’s income. Id. § 1325(b)(4)(A). But the period may be
shorter “if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period.” Id.
§ 1325(b)(4)(B). See also, e.g., Arlen, 461 B.R. at 555 (“Instead of getting their discharges within four to six
months as they would in a no asset [c]hapter 7 proceeding, these debtors would not get a discharge, even under
the design of the original plans, for approximately one and one-half years. And, of course, that discharge is
less comprehensive than in [c]hapter 7.”).
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payment due under the plan that the debtor receives a discharge.60 With
unforeseen future events, such as fluctuations in future income, chapter 13
debtors may default on plan payments—and indeed nearly two-thirds of them
do61—and thus not receive a discharge, a risk that chapter 7 debtors never
face.62
Second, attorney fees in chapter 13 are usually significantly higher than in
chapter 7,63 especially after the passage of BAPCPA.64 In some circumstances,
using chapter 13 to defer fee payments, despite having the option to liquidate
in chapter 7 and receive a much quicker discharge, might be the more
responsible choice for debtors.65 Nevertheless, attorneys have an incentive to
generate business by funneling debtors into chapter 13 who would otherwise
not be in the bankruptcy system due to reluctance or inability to file for chapter
7.66 Even if they have the ability to use either chapter, debtors often lack
sufficient information to make an informed decision between chapters 7 and 13
60

Id. § 1328(a).
Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
62 Positive fluctuations in income also have a detrimental effect. Chapter 13 debtors are under the
supervision of the court for the duration of the plan, and at any time the trustee or an unsecured creditor may
move to modify the plan payments to capture any increase in the debtor’s income. Id. § 1329(a).
63 Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J.
501, 581 (1993) (“Some local officials set standard attorneys’ fees for chapter 13 much higher than the local
median fee for chapter 7.”); see also, e.g., In re Arlen 461 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (“It is
difficult to understand how a [c]hapter 13 plan under these circumstances benefits anyone other than counsel.
The fees charged by counsel in this case are approximately twice what would be charged for [c]hapter 7
proceedings for these [d]ebtors.”).
64 Lupica, supra note 56, at 56–57, 69. As reflected below, the fee study compared chapter 7 and chapter
13 mean attorney fees before and after BAPCPA. Note that a chapter 7 “no-asset case” occurs when, based on
the schedules, “the debtor has no non-exempt assets for liquidation . . . .” In re Venegas, 257 B.R. 41, 44
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). The findings were as follows:
61

Mean Attorney Fee (per case)
Pre-BAPCPA
Post-BAPCPA

Chapter 13
Dismissed
Discharged
Cases
Cases
$1,262
$1,491
$2,061
$2,564

Chapter 7
No-Asset
Cases
$654
$968

Asset
Cases
$821
$1,072

Lupica, supra note 56, at 57, 69”).
65 See, e.g., Crager, 691 F.3d at 674 (involving a debtor who had not yet defaulted on debt payments and
chose chapter 13 over chapter 7 because “it would have taken her over a year to save enough money to pay the
[upfront] costs for a [c]hapter 7 bankruptcy and to do so she would have needed to stop making her minimum
monthly credit card payments”).
66 See Braucher, supra note 63, at 580–81 (studying attorney culture and noting from one city that “highvolume lawyers are much more willing to use chapter 13, primarily for financial reasons, while the lowvolume lawyers think that chapter 13 is a bad deal for clients”).
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and are vulnerable to self-serving advice from their attorney.67 In a close
decision, an attorney motivated by the promise of higher attorney fees may
counsel more debtors into chapter 13,68 despite delaying the debtor’s discharge
for years, raising the likelihood of default, and increasing the burden on the
court system.69
2. The Tension: Does “Can Pay” = “Can Pay Fees”?
In fairness to attorneys, a comparison of fees between chapters ought to
account for the time value of money by comparing chapter 7 fees paid in
today’s dollars with chapter 13 fees paid over time, discounted to present
value. Arguably, the higher fee rate in chapter 13 compensates the attorney for
this—that is, the debtor is essentially financing, not deferring, payment to the
attorney. And given the high rate of default on chapter 13 plans, arguably these
fees ought to earn a significant risk rate.70 For debtors who simply cannot
afford to pay for chapter 7 up front, perhaps this arrangement gives debtors
access to the bankruptcy system while fairly compensating the attorney for the
risk of nonpayment.
But financing attorney fees is not the purpose of chapter 13.71 Should
debtors be allowed to access chapter 13 when they are merely financing
attorney fees and deferring other mandatory costs, and doing nothing else that
could not be done in chapter 7?72 Are these debtors truly “can pay” debtors?73
Shouldn’t such a debtor, as one U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested,

67

Braucher, supra note 63, at 581.
David S. Kennedy, Vanessa A. Lantin & Brent Heilig, Attorney Compensation in Chapter 13 Cases
and Related Matters, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., no. 6, 2004 (citing Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in
Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's
Proposal as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 844 (1994)) (“Do larger fees for debtors'
attorneys in chapter 13 cases influence the choice of that chapter over chapter 7? It has been suggested that it
does. Are larger fees for debtors' attorneys in chapter 13 cases a carrot or incentive for some attorneys to
inappropriately encourage clients to file cases under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 cases? It has been
suggested that they are.”).
69 See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and
Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 437 & n.71 (1999); supra notes 52, 58–62
and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
71 See Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
72 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
68
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proceed pro se instead74—either in chapter 7 or chapter 13? For example, in
chapter 13, proceeding pro se, the debtor could provide some repayment to
unsecured creditors with money that otherwise would have gone to the
attorney. Or suppose the debtor took one bankruptcy judge’s, advice
mentioned at the beginning of this comment: save the money that would
otherwise be used for chapter 13 plan payments; wait a few months; and pay
an attorney for a chapter 7 filing.75
There are two worthy counter-arguments: recall that 1) pro se debtors are
less successful in bankruptcy than represented debtors,76 and 2) under
§ 1325(a)(4) the Code does not actually require a chapter 13 debtor to repay
unsecured creditors any more than they would have received in chapter 7.77
This is the tension that a fee-only plan highlights. Debtors are using chapter
13 to do what the Code seems to implicitly authorize under § 1325(a)(4), read
together the provisions granting attorney fees priority status: finance the full
amount of attorney fees and pay little or nothing to general unsecured
creditors.78 Put another way, debtors are using chapter 13 to finance the full
amount of attorney fees and doing exactly what they could have done in
chapter 7. Yet courts seem to agree that fee-only plans do not pass the smell
test, at least not often.79 And the basic smell test for chapter 13 is whether the
plan is proposed and filed in good faith.80 The next section traces the
development of the good faith test.

74 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (“There is no showing, however,
that the debtor had a pressing need for the [attorney’s] services, . . . that it was infeasible to proceed pro se.”).
75 Brown, 742 at 1312; supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
76 Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77 Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78 Attorney fees are a priority administrative expense claim that must be paid in order to receive a
discharge. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. Thus, under these provisions and § 1325(a)(4), a debtor
must pay his attorney but does not necessarily have to repay unsecured creditors anything.
79 See, e.g., In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013)
(citing In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 22 n.14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010)) (noting that a vast majority of courts find feeonly plans to be in bad faith); In re Hopper, 474 B.R. 872, 886 n.27 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2012).
80 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), (7) (2012).
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C. Chapter 13 Good Faith Analysis: The Development of the Totality of the
Circumstances Test
The concept of good faith is integral to both consumer and business
bankruptcies and is a mandatory requirement for plan confirmation.81 Congress
never defined the term, presumably in deference to judicial discretion.82 Courts
often turn to Collier’s definition of good faith, which states, “[a]
comprehensive definition of good faith is not practical. Broadly speaking, the
basic inquiry should be whether or not under the circumstances of the case
there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [the Chapter] in
the proposal of the plan.”83 As discussed in the remainder of this Part, courts
began applying this broad concept on a case-by-case basis and developed nonexhaustive lists of factors to consider.
1. Pre-1984 Case Law
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Code,84 cases challenging chapter 13
plans for lack of good faith largely turned on the amount of disposable income
the debtor proposed to pay in the plan, as well as the repayment to general
unsecured creditors.85 Some courts held chapter 13 plans required a
“substantial” or “meaningful” repayment to unsecured creditors, above what
§ 1325(a)(4) would require.86 One court relied on legislative history to

81 Id. §§ 1129(b)(3); 1325(a)(3), (7).; In re Gonzales, 172 B.E. 320, 325 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (citing In re
Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1442–44 (9th Cir.1986)).
82 See Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1389–90 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that “courts are
impeded not only by [“good faith”] being an ambiguous term that resists precise definition in any case, but
also by the lack of authoritative guidance on its meaning in § 1325(a)(3),” and indicating that as a court of
equity, bankruptcy judges have discretion to determine what good faith requires in each case (citing Am.
United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940))); In re Mathis, No. 12-056188, 2013 WL 153833, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) (noting Congress’s silence on defining “good
faith” in the chapter 13 statute); In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 19–20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (citing Keach v.
Boyajian (In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851, 856 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (noting the lack of a definition, courts’
varying approaches to interpretation, and that “Congress presumably used the phrase ‘good faith’ in its
ordinary sense”)), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo (In re Buck), No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D.
Mass. April 2, 2014).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Deans v.
O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9.10 at 319
(14th ed. 1978))).
84 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
85 See Brian G. Smooke, Comment, Section 1325(b) and Zero Payment Plans in Chapter 13, 4 BANKR.
DEV. J. 449, 450–54 (1987) (discussing key case law in pre-1984 good faith litigation).
86 See Estus, 695 F.2d at 314; In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 556 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2
B.R. 256, 268 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
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conclude that § 1325(a)(4) merely sets a floor, from which the good faith
standard can be used as a tool to “[e]nsure reasonable offers of repayment.”87
Other courts dissented from this view and held that § 1325(a)(4) was the sole
standard for how much unsecured creditors should be repaid.88 These courts
reasoned good faith only requires “honesty of intention”89 and that plans would
fail the good faith standard under § 1325(a)(3) “only in those unusual cases in
which there has been an abuse of the provisions, purposes, or spirit of [c]hapter
13.”90
Eventually, the circuit courts generally agreed that while the amount of
repayment to unsecured creditors is one of many considerations weighing on
the good faith of a chapter 13 plan,91 good faith should be analyzed on a caseby-case basis, considering the totality of the debtor’s circumstances.92
Concurrently, what specific circumstances a court should consider in each
case also came into focus. In Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull),
the Southern District of Georgia made an early attempt to develop a list of such
factors.93 The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to offer a list of factors
87 Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 266–67 (noting the legislative intent of § 1325(a)(4) requiring “not less than,”
rather than “more than,” was to prevent overpayment where the debtor could liquidate and repay 100 percent
of the unsecured creditors’ claims, as well as “to impose a firm minimum upon which a flexible ‘good faith’
requirement for additional payments could be based”).
88 Barnes v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Estus, 695 F.2d at 314–15;
see also Smooke, supra note 85, at 452–54 (discussing In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 536–37 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1980)).
89 Barnes, 689 F.2d at 200.
90 In re Barnes, 13 B.R. 997, 999 (D.D.C. 1981) (quoting In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 584 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1980)).
91 Estus, 695 F.2d at 315–16 (providing a synopsis of good faith standard development in the federal
circuits); Smooke, supra note 85, at 452–54 (citing as the foundation for this theory Deans v. O’Donnell (In re
Deans), 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982), which involved a plan where the debtor proposed to payment of a vast
majority of her disposable income but nevertheless resulted in no payments to general unsecured creditors).
92 Estus, 695 F.2d at 315–16 (citing Deans, 692 F.2d 968; Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d
426 (7th Cir. 1982); Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); Barnes, 689 F.2d 193).
93 Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 659 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (listing: “(a)
[T]he amount of income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse from all sources; (b) the regular and recurring
living expenses for the debtor and his dependents; (c) the amount of the attorney’s fees to be awarded in the
case and paid by the debtor; (d) the probable or expected duration of the [c]hapter 13 plan; (e) the motivations
of the debtor and his sincerity in seeking relief under the provisions of [c]hapter 13; (f) the ability of the debtor
to earn and the likelihood of future increase or diminution of earnings; (g) special situations such as inordinate
medical expense, or unusual care required for any member of the debtor’s family; (h) the frequency with
which the debtor has sought relief under any section or title of the Bankruptcy Reform Act or its predecessor’s
statutes; (i) the circumstances under which the debtor has contracted his debts and his demonstrated bona fides,
or lack of same, in dealing with his creditors; (j) whether the amount or percentage of payment offered by the
particular debtor would operate or be a mockery of honest, hard-working, well-intended debtors who pay a
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in Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans),94 followed by the Eighth Circuit a few
months later in United States v. Estus (In re Estus).95 In Estus the court
developed an eleven-factor list, based in part on the Deans and lower court
decisions, including Kull:
(1) [T]he amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the
debtor’s surplus; (2) the debtor’s employment history, ability to earn
and likelihood of future increases in income; (3) the probable or
expected duration of the plan; (4) the accuracy of the plan’s
statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repayment of
unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to
mislead the court; (5) the extent of preferential treatment between
classes of creditors; (6) the extent to which secured claims are
modified; (7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether
any such debt is nondischargeable in [c]hapter 7; (8) the existence of
special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses; (9) the
frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act; (10) the motivation and sincerity of the
debtor in seeking [c]hapter 13 relief; and (11) the burden which the
96
plan’s administration would place upon the trustee.

In adopting a variation of Kull and Estus, the Eleventh Circuit noted that all
circuit courts agreed the amount of repayment to unsecured creditors was also
a factor, even though it was not on the enumerated list.97
Today, all but two of the federal circuit courts have expressly adopted the
“totality of the circumstances” test as their standard.98 While not specifically
addressing the issue, the Supreme Court implicitly approved the test by citing

higher percentage of their claims consistent with the purpose and spirit of [c]hapter 13; (k) the burden which
the administration of the plan would place on the trustee; and (l) the salutary rehabilitative provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which are to be construed liberally in favor of the debtor.”).
94 Deans, 692 F.2d at 972 (“[N]ot only the percentage of proposed repayment, but also the debtor’s
financial situation, the period of time payment will be made, the debtor’s employment history and prospects,
the nature and amount of unsecured claims, the debtor’s past bankruptcy filings, the debtor’s honesty in
representing facts, and any unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.”).
95 Estus, 695 F.2d at 317.
96 Id. (citing Deans, 692 F.2d at 972; Kull, 12 B.R. at 659; In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 882 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 267 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980)).
97 Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983).
98 See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012); Brandon L. Johnson,
Comment, Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should the Good Faith Inquiry Evaluate the Proposed Amount
of Repayment?, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 375, 379 & n.26 (2001) (noting that the “totality of the circumstances”
approach is used in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
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lower court cases that applied it.99 The two federal circuits that have not
expressly adopted the test—the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit—have used a subjective, case-by-case determination and cited other
circuit precedent approvingly.100 All of the lower courts in both circuits have
also adopted the test, either expressly101 or implicitly.102
Courts uniformly agree that—like many fact-intensive, subjective standards
in the law—any list of factors is not exhaustive of all the relevant
considerations.103 But these lists have become guideposts and drive a
substantial portion of the good-faith inquiry in chapter 13.104

99

Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 522–23 (2010) (citing In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.
2007); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Glenn, 288 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2002)).
100 See Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted) (holding that the good faith standard requires the debtor’s honesty, and focuses on his “conduct in the
submission, approval, and implementation of a [c]hapter 13 bankruptcy plan”); Barnes v. Whelan (In re
Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding good faith requires an “honesty of intention”); Goeb
v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “whether the debtor has
misrepresented facts in his plan, unfairly manipulated the [Code], or otherwise proposed his [c]hapter 13 plan
in an inequitable manner”).
101 See Tennessee Commerce Bank v. Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680, 683 (D. Vt. 2009); Plagakis v. Gelberg (In
re Plagakis), No. 03-CV-0728, 2004 WL 203090, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2004); Connelly v. Bath Nat’l
Bank, No. 93-CV-6449, 1995 WL 822677, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1995); In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 57–58
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008); Finizie v. City of Bridgeport (In re Finizie), 184 B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1995).
102 In re Yavarkovsky, 23 B.R. 756, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding a similar, if not largely the same,
standard for good faith that “contemplates a broad judicial inquiry into the conduct and state of mind of the
debtor” and considers “all aspects of fair dealing . . . the lawfulness of the debtor’s conduct . . . good faith in
dealing with creditors and their claims”); In re Allen, 300 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2003).
103 See Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014); Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re
Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The totality of the circumstances test cannot be reduced to a
mechanical checklist, and we do not endeavor here to canvass the field and catalogue the factors that must be
weighed when [when ruling on good faith].”); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982) (“We make no attempt to enumerate all relevant
considerations since the factors and the weight they are to be given will vary with the facts and circumstances
of the case.”); In re Dicey, 312 B.R. 456, 459 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (“No one factor is determinative, but it is
the totality of all the various factors and the facts of the particular case that is considered.”). See generally
Elbein, supra note 12.
104 See generally Elbein, supra note 12, at 453–54; Ellen M. Horn, Good Faith and Chapter 13
Discharge: How Much Discretion Is Too Much?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 667–69 (1990).
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2. 1984, Disposable Income, and Ability to Pay
With the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act (“BAFJA”) of 1984, Congress added § 1325(b) to the Code.105 In its
original form, § 1325(b)(1) provided that upon objection by the trustee or an
unsecured claim holder, the court may only approve the plan if the debtor
either repays 100% of the objecting unsecured creditor’s claim or commits to
the plan his entire “projected disposable income to be received” during the
plan’s duration.106 Section 1325(b)(2) sets forth the statutory measure of what
constitutes “disposable income” under the “ability to pay” test in
§ 1325(b)(1)(B).107
While the ability to pay test effectively ended good faith litigation over the
amount of disposable income a debtor proposed to pay into the plan, the new
test raised scholarly debate over whether it swallowed up the entire good faith
inquiry, except where the debtor was clearly fraudulent or misrepresented the
facts.108 Section 1325(b) appeared to eliminate the disposable income payment
ratio in good faith analysis, and courts wrestled with whether the amount of
repayment to unsecured creditors was now an issue of § 1325(b), § 1325(a)(3),
or both.109 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that a chapter 13 plan
“otherwise confirmable will be confirmed even if it provides for minimal (or
no) payments if those payments meet the [§ 1325(b)] ‘ability to pay’ test.”110
3. BAPCPA
With the passage of BAPCPA, Congress amended § 1325(b)(1)(B) to make
a plan confirmable if the debtor commits all projected disposable income
received during the plan period “to make payments to unsecured creditors

105 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333,
356 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012)).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Compare In re McGehan 495 B.R. 37, 43 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013) (noting that “enactment of the ability
to pay test in § 1325(b)(1) narrowed the good faith analysis, subsuming most of the [factors set forth by early
Tenth Circuit precedent]”), with Richard S. Bell, The Effect of the Disposable Income Test of Section
1325(b)(1)(B) upon the Good Faith Inquiry of Section 1325(a)(3), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 267–71 (1988)
(arguing that the disposable income test did not significantly alter the good faith totality of the circumstances
standard in response to Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89
(1987), which argued the opposite).
109 See Smooke, supra note 85, at 465–74 (reviewing case law reaching each of these three conclusions).
110 In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
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under the plan.”111 This amendment supported the view that the percentage of
repayment to general unsecured creditors was not an issue of good faith.
Congress also added § 1325(a)(7), a mandatory requirement for plan
confirmation that “the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good
faith.”112 Whereas § 1325(a)(3) requires good faith in proposing the plan, this
new provision sought to eliminate confusion amongst courts as to whether
§ 1325(a)(3) applies only to proposing the plan or also extends to filing the
petition.113 Now, litigants often challenge good faith under both provisions,
and courts’ analysis of the provisions is indistinguishable.114
II. “FEE-ONLY”
A. Defining the Term for Analysis
For practicality and simplicity, this Comment defines and uses the term
“fee-only” to mean any chapter 13 plan that proposes to pay the debtor’s
attorney fees and other mandatory administrative costs, while repaying 2% or
less of the total amount of prepetition claims to general unsecured creditors.115
Drawing the line at 2% or less mirrors the range repayment occurring in a vast
majority of the cases that refer to the plan as “fee-only,” or some related term.
This Comment will also discuss other cases in the study’s data set, which
include general unsecured repayment as high as 10%, as “low percentage.”

111

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1325(a)(7) (emphasis added).
113 Compare In re Ford, 78 B.R. 729, 733 & n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting In re Flick, 14 B.R. 912,
916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)) (noting “there is no requirement that the petition be filed in good faith . . . only a
requirement that the plan be proposed in good faith”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Smith, 848 F.2d
at 820 (citations omitted) (holding that the court must assess, using the same analysis, the good faith standard
in filing the plan and petition).
114 See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager),
691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Yarborough, No. 12-30549, 2012 WL 4434053, at *4 n.5 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (citing In re Hall, 346 B.R. 420, 426 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006)) (noting that “good
faith standards under § 1325(a)(3) and (a)(7) are almost identical to those involving good faith and dismissal
under § 1307(c)”).
115 The repayment amount refers to the pro rata rate. Suppose a debtor’s chapter 13 plan proposes she pay
her two general unsecured creditors (“creditor 1” and “creditor 2”) $300 over the life of the plan. If creditor 1
has an allowed claim of $5,000, and creditor 2 has an allowed claim of $10,000, then the total general
unsecured debt is $15,000. The $300 payment represents 2% of the total general unsecured debt. Thus, each
creditor would receive a pro rata payment of 2% of its allowed claim. The result is creditor 1 receives $100,
and creditor 2 receives $200.
112
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“Fee-only” is an informal term;116 other phrasings for the concept include
“zero payment,”117 “attorney fee-only,”118 “de minimis,”119 and “attorney-feecentric.”120 While no precise definition exists, these terms generally refer to
chapter 13 plans that propose either zero or nominal repayments to general
unsecured creditors, though the plans may nevertheless pay secured and
priority unsecured claims.121 Trustees have even challenged the reasonableness
of attorney fee awards under the good faith standard specifically when the plan
proposes to pay almost the entire amount of repayments to the debtor
attorney’s fees, thereby rendering the fee award unreasonable.122 Some feeonly plans do exactly that: pay only the mandatory administrative expense
claims, including attorney and trustee fees.123 These plans do not pay secured
or priority debts through the plan, and also propose to discharge 100% of the
general unsecured debt.124
Two interesting subsets of cases have arisen that are worth noting: 1) plans
with “early termination language,” which almost always leave unsecured
creditors with no repayment125; and 2) “attorney-fee-centric” plans, which

116 See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting it is
“colloquially known as a ‘fee-only’ plan”).
117 See Smooke, supra note 85, at 450–54.
118 See In re Buck, 32 B.R. 13, 18, & n.7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo
(In re Buck), No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D. Mass. April 2, 2014).
119 See Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 658 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
120 Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014).
121 See, e.g., Puffer, 674 F.3d at 80–81 (describing fee-only plans as those that leave “the general
[unsecured] creditors holding an empty (or nearly empty) bag”) (emphasis added). Compare id. at 80
(involving a plan payment of “$300 (or about 2% of the roughly $15,000 owed by the debtor)”), and Buck, 432
B.R. at 18 n.7 (noting the “Attorney Fee-Only” plan actually “provided a [de minimis] dividend to unsecured
creditors”), with Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 969 (4th Cir. 1982) (involving plan where
general unsecured creditors received nothing).
122 See Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (involving a trustee challenge
that the bankruptcy court erroneously awarded debtor’s attorney a fee amounting to “almost the entire amount
paid to the Trustee”). One court even used the term “fee-only” to refer to two chapter 13 plans proposing
general unsecured creditor repayments of 16% and 18%. In re Jackson, No. 11-42528-13, 2012 WL 909782, at
*1–2, 4–7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309,
1316 (11th Cir. 2014). Fee-only analysis may have been used because the court concluded the debtors’
primary motivation for using chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 was to finance their attorneys’ fees over time.
Also, at least one of the plans would not begin funding unsecured creditors until almost halfway through the
duration of the plan. Id. at *1–2.
123 See Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 316–17 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 826
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2009).
124 See, e.g., Ingram, 482 B.R. at 316; In re Molina, 420 B.R. at 826.
125 In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013).
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front-load attorney fees in the monthly plan payments and do not begin
repayment to unsecured creditors until the final months of the plan.126
1. Early Termination Language
Early termination language allows the debtor, with the trustee’s consent, to
cease payments and receive a discharge as soon as the plan satisfies all
mandatory requirements—including attorney fees as a priority administrative
expense—even though this occurs before the end of the applicable
commitment period.127 Because chapter 13 requires debtors to pay all projected
disposable income to general unsecured creditors for the applicable
commitment period, early termination benefits debtors with zero or negative
projected disposable income.128 Early termination language prevents general
unsecured creditors from receiving the full benefit of applicable commitment
period for repayment.
Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
disposed of three cases, all involving similar facts, where each plan contained
early termination language.129 Each of the chapter 13 debtors listed zero or
negative projected disposable income.130 The applicable commitment period
was 36 months for two of the plans and 60 months for the third.131 The early
termination language however allowed payments to cease after 23, 32, and 36

126
127

Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311, 1314.
Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2. The early termination language in that case was as follows:
This [c]hapter 13 [p]lan will be deemed complete and shall cease and a discharge shall be
entered, upon payment to the Trustee of a sum sufficient to pay in full: (A) [a]llowed
administrative priority claims, including specifically the Trustee’s commissions and attorneys’
fees and expenses ordered by the Court to be paid to the Debtor’s Attorney, (B) allowed secured
claims (including but not limited to arrearage claims), excepting those which are scheduled to be
paid directly by the Debtor “outside” the plan, (C) [a]llowed unsecured priority claims, (D)
[c]osign protect consumer debt claims (only where the Debtor proposes such treatment), (E)
[postpetition] claims allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 1305, (F) [t]he dividend, if any, required to be
paid to non-priority general unsecured creditors (not including priority unsecured creditors)
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), and (G) [a]ny extra amount necessary to satisfy the
“liquidation test” as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

Id.
128

See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).
Barnes, 2013 WL 153848; In re Mathis, No. 12-05618-8, 2013 WL 153833 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15,
2013); In re Tedder, No. 12-06232-8, 2013 WL 145416 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2013).
130 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *1.
131 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *1.
129
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months, respectively, and repay nothing to general unsecured creditors.132
Without the early termination language, and assuming the debtor completed
payments through the applicable commitment period, general unsecured
creditors would have received repayments of 5.2%, 2.1%, and 6.5%,
respectively.133 Using nearly identical analysis in all three cases, the court
suggested the plans would not satisfy the good faith standard as proposed.134
The court held the early termination language in each plan was void and
ordered the trustees to file a confirmation motion on the plans without early
termination.135 The court found the resulting minimal repayment to unsecured
creditors were sufficient to satisfy the good faith standard because the
“attorney[s] will not be the only recipient of plan dividends.”136
2. Attorney-Fee-Centric Plans
Attorney-fee-centric plans structure the plan payments such that the
attorney gets paid first; the facts of Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 137 discussed
in more detail later in this Comment,138 are illustrative. In Brown the plan
proposed to make monthly payments of $150 (the debtor’s monthly projected
disposable income) for the full three-year applicable commitment period.139
But the attorney and administrative fees would be paid in full first, which
would take seventeen months, and the plan would not begin repaying
unsecured creditors until the eighteenth month.140 These plans, however, may
propose a higher repayment to unsecured creditors than what this Comment
has defined as fee-only or low percentage; in fact, the plan in Brown proposed
to repay 17% of general unsecured claims.141 But because the plans front-load
payments to the attorney and trustee, the chances that general unsecured
creditors will be repaid becomes more remote, even if the plan proposes some
meaningful amount of repayment.142
132

Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *2; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *2.
Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *13.
134 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at
*12–13.
135 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12–13; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12–13; Tedder, 2013 WL
145416, at *13.
136 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *12.
137 See generally Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2014).
138 See infra Part II.B.3.
139 Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1311.
142 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
133
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B. Bad Faith Per Se?
During the first decade following the adoption of the Code, some courts
ruled fee-only plans were a per se violation of good faith under § 1325(a)(3).
An extreme example is In re Lattimore, where the court held the debtors’ “zero
payment plan” was per se bad faith, despite the debtors proposing a monthly
payment of $214, which exceeded their monthly disposable income by $26.143
A competing view emerged in cases like In re Greer, maintaining that first,
fee-only plans are not per se bad faith, and second, courts should not abandon
the totality of the circumstances test when evaluating them.144 Courts remain
divided to this day when dealing with fee-only plans.145 Three recent federal
circuit court decisions have held there is no per se rule against fee-only
plans.146 The remainder of this Part discusses those opinions.
1. Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer) and Special Circumstances
In March 2012, the First Circuit decided In re Puffer, which involved a
debtor with nearly $15,000 in general unsecured debt.147 The debtor’s attorney
presented his fee schedule as follows: $2,300 from the previous chapter 7
filing, which must be paid up front, and approximately $4100 for chapter 13
fees, which could be paid over the course of the plan.148 As in Crager, the
debtor lacked sufficient funds to pay the chapter 7 fees and thus filed for
chapter 13.149 The debtor’s plan proposed $3,600 in payments over three years,
distributed as follows: $2,900 for debtor’s attorney fees, $400 for trustee fees,
and only $300 to general unsecured claims—approximately 2% of

143 See In re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622, 623–26 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (also finding that the excessive
payment failed the § 1325(a)(6) requirement that the debtor will be able to complete all plan payments).
144 See In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
145 Compare In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90, 102–03 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (concluding under a totality
standard that no payments to unsecured creditors is insufficient for finding bad faith, especially in this case,
where “[a]ll of the [d]ebtor’s disposable income, and then some, is devoted to the plan”), with In re Jackson,
No. 11-42528-13, 2012 WL 909782, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2012) (noting most courts find fee-only
plans to be per se bad faith), and In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (holding that feeonly plans are per se bad faith as “inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of [c]hapter 13” and failing “to
understand how a [fee-only plan] . . . benefits anyone other than counsel”).
146 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager),
691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012).
147 Puffer, 674 F.3d at 80.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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repayment.150 The bankruptcy court held the debtor’s filing was a fee-only plan
and therefore was per se bad faith under § 1325(a)(3) and (7).151
The First Circuit reversed, holding fee-only plans are not per se bad
faith.152 The court explained, “[n]otwithstanding [a fee-only plan’s]
shortcomings, endorsing a blanket rule that fee-only [c]hapter 13 plans are per
se submitted in bad faith would be to throw out the baby with the
bathwater.”153 While conceding a case-by-case inquiry governs the good faith
analysis in all chapter 13 cases,154 the court warned, “[t]his opinion should by
no means be read as a paean to fee-only [c]hapter 13 plans. The dangers of
such plans are manifest, and a debtor who submits such a plan carries a heavy
burden of demonstrating special circumstances that justify its submission.”155
Because the bankruptcy court had not applied the totality of the circumstances
test, the court remanded the case to determine whether the plan was in good
faith.156 While it did not offer a definitive list of special circumstances, the
court offered guidance on the circumstances that might justify a fee-only plan:
There is no showing, however, that the debtor had a pressing need for
the appellant’s services, that he could not secure adequate
representation that he could afford without resorting to a fee-only
plan, or that it was infeasible to proceed pro se. Furthermore, the
debtor himself asserted that he could have retained the appellant for
representation in [c]hapter 7—a course usually more in line with the
interests of the debtor, the creditors, and the bankruptcy court—if he
had waited three months longer; and the record contains no
compelling reason why a three-month wait would have been
157
intolerable.

a. The Remand
On remand, the bankruptcy court found the debtor’s chapter 13 plan still
failed the good faith standard.158 Satisfied that the First Circuit had fully
adopted the totality of the circumstances test for assessing good faith, the court

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. (citing Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Id.
Id.
In re Puffer, 478 B.R. 101, 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012).
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focused its attention on whether special circumstances existed.159 The court
noted that there “can be no exhaustive definition of the term ‘special
circumstances,’” but emphasized the First Circuit’s notion that such
circumstances justifying a fee-only plan are “far from the norm.”160 Instead of
using the First Circuit’s examples, the court described the debtor’s financial
and living situations, his vehicle repossession, the constant harassment he
received from his creditors, and the fact he had waited 10 months to file for
chapter 13 protection after the initial meeting with his attorney.161 Based on
these facts, the court concluded no special circumstances existed.162
b. Interpreting the Holding
Special circumstances, however, is already included in most court’s list of
totality of the circumstances factors.163 This raises ambiguity in Puffer as to
whether 1) a showing of special circumstances is a mandatory requirement for
fee-only plans, or 2) special circumstances is merely the most important factor
in the totality of the circumstances test. The remand opinion from the
bankruptcy court seemed to think the former was correct. If that is the case,
this special circumstances requirement is similar to the abuse presumption in
the chapter 7 means test, which if raised may be rebutted “by demonstrating
special circumstances.”164 Analogously, a fee-only plan raises a presumption
that the plan is in bad faith, but that presumption may be rebutted by a showing
of special circumstances. This comparison—or a detailed procedure for
showing special circumstances similar to § 707(b)(2)(B)—was not suggested
by the First Circuit or the bankruptcy court on remand but the analysis appears
to be similar.165

159

Id. at 107.
Id.
161 Id. at 107–08.
162 Id.
163 See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
164 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 707(b)(1) provides for a chapter 7 case
dismissal or conversion to chapter 11 or 13 upon a finding that “the granting of relief would be an abuse of the
provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 707(b)(1). Section 707(b)(2) provides that abuse is presumed if a debtor fails
the means test. Id. § 707(b)(2).
165 See id. § 707(b)(2)(B) (setting forth detailed requirements for showing special circumstances to rebut
the abuse presumption).
160
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2. Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager)
The Fifth Circuit decided In re Crager in August 2012.166 The debtor had
over $40,000 in mortgage debt and over $7,800 in general unsecured consumer
debt from credit cards.167 Despite her unemployment, reliance on food stamps,
and that her only income was from Social Security benefits, the debtor was
able to remain current on her mortgage and credit card payments.168 The debtor
filed for bankruptcy after learning she would not complete her credit card
payments for nearly two decades at her current rate of payment.169 The debtor
filed for chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 in part due to the attorney fee
burden.170 To save enough money to pay for the chapter 7 attorney fees up
front, she would have been forced to forgo her credit card payments and wait
over a year.171 The trustee objected to plan confirmation under § 1325(a)(3)
and (7).172
The bankruptcy court overruled the objection, but the district court reversed
and found the plan to be in bad faith because nearly all of the plan payments
would go to the debtor’s attorney fees.173 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding as a matter of law that a fee-only plan “leaving other unsecured
creditors unpaid, is [not] a per se violation of the ‘good faith’ requirement.”174
The court found the debtor’s fee-only plan was not an attempt to abuse chapter
13, “but rather a responsible decision given [the debtor’s] particular
circumstances.”175
3. Brown v. Gore (In re Brown)
The Eleventh Circuit weighed in the fee-only issue in February 2014 and
also declined to adopt a per se rule.176 As discussed earlier, the debtor in
Brown proposed an attorney-fee-centric plan where repayment to the
unsecured creditors would not begin until the eighteenth month of the thirty-

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 675.
Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2014).
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six-month plan.177 The debtor’s plan proposed to pay $150 per month, a total
of $5,400, as follows: $2,000 in attorney fees, $281 to the court as a filing fee,
$70 to the attorney to cover the debtor’s credit report and mandatory credit
counseling, $243 in trustee commission, and the remainder to creditors, all of
whom were general unsecured. Full completion of the plan would result in a
17% repayment to general unsecured creditors, taking the plan far outside the
bounds of fee-only.178 Nevertheless, the court expressed doubt the debtor could
successfully do so179 and treated the case as a fee-only plan that would not
repay any creditors and would only benefit the debtor’s attorney.180 The court
stated “there was a reasonable likelihood that Brown would not complete his
[c]hapter 13 plan and would never pay those creditors anything.”181
The court thoroughly recited the bankruptcy judge’s strong language
against attorney-fee-centric plans and upheld the application of the totality of
the circumstances test (here, using the Kitchens list of factors) under a clearly
erroneous standard of review.182 Noting that the bankruptcy court did not adopt
a per se rule against attorney-fee-centric or fee-only plans, the court stated,
“Our precedent demands a multi-factor analysis of the particular facts of a case
to determine whether good faith existed, . . . which is what the bankruptcy
court did here.”183
The court did not address the Puffer special circumstances approach, but
did note that no “unique circumstances” existed that would justify why the
debtor was better off filing for chapter 13 relief rather than chapter 7.184 This
analysis, however, appeared to be in the context of applying the Kitchens
factors, though the court did not expressly state it was applying the eighth
factor, “special circumstances such as inordinate medical expense.”185

177

Supra notes 139–39 and accompanying text.
Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311. The debtor filed the plan prior to the creditors’ deadline for filing claims,
and ultimately, only three creditors filed claims, representing less than 10% of the total debt owed. “The
bankruptcy court speculated that few ‘creditors bothered to file claims perhaps because the likelihood of any
meaningful payments was not feasible’ under Brown's meagre budget, and any ‘distribution from the trustee
will be of little consequence.’” Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1318.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1313–19.
183 Id. at 1318–19.
184 Id. at 1318.
185 See id. at 1317–18.
178
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In summary, three circuit opinions all agree that fee-only plans should not
be automatically barred for bad faith, though Puffer potentially applies a
modified approach to the traditional totality of the circumstances test. With this
precedent as a backdrop, Part III proceeds with the empirical analysis to
determine whether courts’ application the totality of the circumstances test to
fee-only plans reveals any statistically significant trends.
III. ANALYSIS
This empirical study has three goals. First, it seeks to understand whether
chapter 13 fee-only plans are statistically significant to a court’s finding of
good faith compared to low percentage plans. Again, this study chooses to
define a fee-only plan as any plan proposing a 2% or less repayment to general
unsecured creditors while paying debtor attorney fees. Second, it seeks to
determine if any factors in the totality of the circumstances test are statistically
significant to a finding of good faith for fee-only plans. Third, it analyzes how
the discussion or listing186 of any factor, or combination of factors, affects a
finding of good faith.
Part III contains four subparts. Part III.A describes the method of analysis,
including the types of data gathered and a description of the sample. Part III.B
discusses the assumptions and limitations of the study, as well as any
corresponding effects on the sample. Part III.C lists and describes the totality
of the circumstances factors that the study coded and the specific judicial
language that triggered coding for each factor.187 Finally, Part III.D presents
the results of the study and offers brief insights to precede a fuller discussion
of the implications of the results in Part IV.
A. Method
For the data sample, this study selected cases decided after the enactment
of the modern Code in 1978. This wide date range recognizes that while the
totality of the circumstances test may have evolved over time, courts have
always encountered chapter 13 plans that pay attorney’s fees while leaving a
nominal amount, or nothing, for general unsecured creditors.188 From this
186

See infra Part III.C.
When this study refers to coding for factors or other data points, “coding” means to account for a
variable in a quantifiable way, such as assigning the court’s ruling on the good faith issue (one of the
variables) a set of values. For example, the ruling on good faith is a simple binary variable: good or bad.
188 See supra Part I.B.
187
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broad sample, the study screened cases for inclusion in the data set from two
sources. First, the study consulted an American Law Reports article that
analyzed rulings on the § 1325(a)(3) good faith standard as the repayment to
general unsecured creditors changed.189 Next, the study formulated a search
query in WestlawNext for all federal cases with the following terms and
connectors: “1325(a)” and “good faith.”190 The purpose of this initial query
was to capture any case in which § 1325(a)(3), § 1325(a)(7), or both were at
issue.
This search query was then narrowed in three iterations, independent of one
another. The first iteration narrowed the search to cases containing the phrases
“fee only,” “fee centric,” or “zero payment.”191 This narrowed query retrieved
a total of 147 cases. The narrowing terms were sufficient to capture all the
previously discussed terminologies for fee only plans except “de minimis,”192
which was narrowed separately for convenience. The second iteration
narrowed the search to cases containing the phrase “de minimis.” This query
retrieved all cases with the “Amount of Repayment; De Minimis Repayment”
headnote, a total of 365 cases.193 Finally, the third iteration included the
following terms and connectors: (attorney! or counsel! or lawyer!) /6 (pay! or
paid! or receiv!).194 This iteration retrieved a total of 390 cases.
The third iteration—intended to capture additional cases that discuss
payment to attorneys—was motivated by the Crager opinion.195 The first two
iterations did not capture Crager because the opinion does not refer to a feeonly plan or analogous terminology, but merely states, “There is no rule in this
189 Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Effect, on “Good-Faith” Requirement of § 1325(a)(3) of Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 1325(a)(3)) for Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan, of Debtor’s Offer of Less Than
Full Repayment to Unsecured Creditors, 73 A.L.R. FED. 10, 13 (1985).
190 Placing a phrase in parentheses ensures that the search will only retrieve cases with the exact phrase,
“good faith,” as opposed to any case that merely contains “good” and “faith” somewhere in the text.
191 This was done in WestlawNext’s “search within results” feature and inputted as: “fee only” or “fee
centric” or “zero payment.” These singular terms also retrieve all plural and possessive forms, as well as
hyphenations (e.g., “fee-only”).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 116–19.
193 In the Key Numbering System for Westlaw Headnotes, key number 51k3710 is entitled “Amount of
Repayment; De Minimis Repayment.”
194 The exclamation point is a root expander and will retrieve any case that contains the word in front of
the exclamation point or its variant, as long as the variant contains at least the root word. For example, using
“attorney!” will retrieve “attorneys” and “attorney’s” in addition to “attorney.” The use of “receiv!” instead of
“receive!” ensures retrieval of “receiving” as well. This terms and connectors string retrieves any case where at
least one of the words or its variant in the first parenthetical appears in the text within six words of any word or
its variant within the second parenthetical.
195 Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012).
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circuit that a [c]hapter 13 plan that results in the debtor’s counsel receiving
almost the entire amount paid to the Trustee, leaving other unsecured creditors
unpaid, is a per se violation of the ‘good faith’ requirement.”196 The decision to
retrieve cases where the first string of terms falls within six words of the
second string was based on Crager, where a term from the first string (counsel)
appears within six words of a second string word (paid).197 While a second
string word (receiving) did immediately follow a first string word (counsel),198
the expansion to six words between the strings ensured broader retrieval. III.B
discusses the practical limitations a case like Crager presents.
Unsurprisingly, two or more of the search queries often retrieved the same
cases. From this broad retrieval, the study then screened cases for fee-only and
low percentage criteria—that is, chapter 13 plans proposing payment between
0% and 10% to allowed general unsecured claims.199
Ultimately, the study proceeded with data set 61 cases. At a minimum,
cases used in the study include 1) a final ruling from the court on good faith
and 2) the amount of repayment to general unsecured creditors.200 When
coding for the general unsecured creditor repayment, this study assigned a
percentage, defined as the total repayment to general unsecured creditors,
divided by the total amount of general unsecured debt from allowed claims.201
As mentioned in Part III.A., coding for the court’s ruling on good faith is a
simple binary value, as there are only two possible outcomes: a court finds the
plan to be in good faith or in bad faith. Before discussing the list of factors this
study used to code for the totality of the circumstances test, Part III.B.
discusses the assumptions and limitations of this study.
B. Assumptions and Limitations
This study assumed the debtor’s attorney fees in each case are an allowed
priority administrative expense claim for which the plan must provide
196

Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 675.
198 Id.
199 As defined by this Comment, fee-only plans are those with a 0% to 2% repayment, and low percentage
plans are those with a greater than 2% but less than or equal to 10% repayment. See supra Part II.A.
200 For the general unsecured creditor repayment, this means that either the case listed the percentage or
contained sufficient, unambiguous information—the total amount of general unsecured debt and the proposed
repayment on those claims—to calculate the percentage. See, e.g., In re Weiser, 391 B.R. 902, 910 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2008) (“proposing to pay approximately 5% of the total unsecured debt over five years”).
201 See supra note 115.
197
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payment.202 Even beyond this one assumption, there are also four specific
limitations to this study.
First, some chapter 13 debtors pay their attorneys prior to filing, and such
cases were not excluded from the study.203 Of course, the debtor may not have
paid for legal counsel (e.g., pro bono representation or pro se filings), and if
the opinion indicated this, the case was excluded. Otherwise, the study
assumed that the debtor paid for an attorney. Exclusion of pro se filings was
not problematic, as each opinion listed the attorney of record for both parties to
the case. Pro bono representation was not always apparent from the opinion,
but this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the data, as a recent
bankruptcy fee study found that less than 7% of all chapter 13 filings are pro
bono.204
Second, cases often lacked the information necessary for inclusion in the
study, leading to the exclusion of many potentially relevant cases (i.e., cases
litigating § 1325(a)(3) or (7) in part because of a low repayment to unsecured
creditors).205 Unless the percentage of repayment on total unsecured claims
was clear in the opinion, the case was excluded. Time and resource constraints
prevented this study from seeking plan schedules or other court documents that
might have provided missing information or resolved these ambiguities. While
inclusion of such cases might have affected the outcome of the data, this study
contains an adequate sample by which to gain insight into good faith analysis
of fee-only plans.

202 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(4)(B), 503(b)(2), 507(a)(2), 1322(a)(2) (2012). Section 1322(a)(2) states that
a chapter 13 plan “shall provide for the full payment . . . of all claims entitled to priority under section 507.”
Id. § 1322(a)(2). Section 507(a)(2) lists as a priority claim “administrative expenses allowed under section
503(b).” Id. § 507(a)(2). Section 503(b)(2) lists as an allowed administrative expense “compensation and
reimbursement awarded under section 330(a).” Id. § 503(b)(2). Section 330(a)(4)(B) states, “[i]n a . . . chapter
13 case . . . the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney [with certain
qualifications].” Id. § 330(a)(4)(B).
203 See, e.g., In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
204 Lupica, supra note 56, at 83 & n.141 (reporting that 6.8% of pre-BAPCPA chapter 13 filings and 4.9%
of post-BAPCPA filings contained “an attorney of record on the docket listing, but there was no fee paid”).
205 For example, some cases may discuss a plan proposal with one or more amendments. The opinion may
have been unclear on the contents of the final plan or under which amended version it is analyzing good faith,
For example, In re Oliver, 186 B.R. 403, 405–06 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995), involved a three-year plan proposing
approximately a 10% repayment to unsecured creditors—qualifying for this study as low percentage plan. The
debtor orally amended the plan to five years, promising a roughly 17% repayment—thus taking the plan
outside the range of this study. Then, when analyzing good faith, the court seemed to ignore the oral
modification and assessed only the original three-year plan proposal. Id. This case was excluded from this
study.
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Third, it is difficult at times to determine which factors each court has truly
considered. While some level of subjectivity is unavoidable, this study does
not intend to parse out a court’s subjective rationale, such as the weight a judge
gives a particular factor compared to others. Rather, the intent of the study, to
the extent possible, is to objectively measure the factors on which a court relies
to reach its ruling. The goal is to provide a general picture, not necessarily a
precise measurement, of how courts treat chapter 13 cases as the general
unsecured repayment approaches zero. Certainly there may be considerations
that do not appear in the text of an opinion, and as courts readily admit, the
intent of the factors is to serve as an analytical framework, not an exhaustive
list of all considerations.206
Fourth, and finally, the various lists of factors across jurisdictions do not
fall into one definitive list with perfect overlap. For example, the Eighth
Circuit’s traditional list includes “the extent of preferential treatment between
classes of creditors”;207 while the Seventh Circuit lists “the debtor’s treatment
of creditors both before and after the petition was filed.”208 As shown below,
the study treats these factors analogously, though there may be practical and
theoretical differences. As best it can, this study compiles all the factors into a
workable list, making such discrepancies and inconsistencies unavoidable. To
the extent possible, the study groups similar concepts together to serve the
purpose of identifying statistically significant considerations courts use to
address good faith in fee-only plans. The next section will offer some examples
of these challenges and the study’s treatment of them.
C. Factors Used in Determining Good Faith
This study gathered data on the totality of the circumstances factors that a
case opinion lists and those that it discusses. Listed factors are those that the
court lists in each case. This study coded listed factors as simple binary values:
a case either lists a given factor or it does not. If the court does not list its
factors but cites to previous binding authority that does, those factors are coded
as listed in the present case. If there was any ambiguity, such as citation to
multiple authorities, this study coded for the factor list on which the court most
clearly relies.209
206

Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See Estus, 695 F.2d at 317.
208 See In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992).
209 For example, suppose the text of the opinion cites to authority with a factor listing, but there is also an
express listing of factors from another authority in a footnote. In that circumstance the study counted the actual
207
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Likewise, this study coded discussed factors as simple binary values: a case
either discusses a given factor or it does not. Discussed factors are those that
are determinative to a court’s ruling on good faith. Because very few opinions
contain distinct sections or paragraphs analyzing a particular factor,210 this
study counted any identifiable analysis of the totality of the circumstances
under the facts of the case.211 As Part III.B. explained above, a court’s
subjective analysis may implicate more than one factor in ways that are not
easily separable. The remainder of this Part explains those challenges within
the context of each factor and how the study addressed them.
The following sections present the list of factors that this study coded.
Included is a brief description of each factor, its various phrasings and
examples where the study coded for it, and any theoretical overlaps. When
practical and unambiguous, this Comment refers to each factor by its
Subsection number (e.g., “Factor 1”).
1. Percent Repayment to General Unsecured Creditors (“Factor 1”)
Despite Factor 1’s clear relevance to fee-only plans, it rarely appears in a
factor list. Regardless of whether it stood alone or in concert with another
consideration, this study coded for Factor 1 any time the court discussed the
low (or lack of) payment to general unsecured creditors.212
For example, one court found that a chapter 13 plan was in bad faith where
the debtor proposed to pay nothing to general unsecured creditors, to continue

list in the footnote, not the list from the text citation. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, No. 13-09-10955, 2009 WL
2913224, at *2 n.3 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 19, 2009).
210 Compare In re Thomas, 443 B.R. 213, 217–19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (not including distinct
sections), with In re Lancaster. 280 B.R. 468, 480–82 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (including distinct, numbered
paragraphs for the discussion of each factor).
211 But many opinions do analyze good faith under a distinct, identifiable heading. See, e.g., Thomas, 443
B.R. at 217 (using “Good Faith” as a heading). Others did not, but this study only included such cases when
the analysis of good faith was clearly identifiable. See, e.g., In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 827–33 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2009) (containing only an “Analysis” heading, but included in the study because discussion of good
faith was easily identifiable).
212 See United States v. Smith (In re Smith), 199 B.R. 56, 59 (N.D. Okla. 1996). Factor 1 was coded in
this case due to the following: “The fact that the unsecured claim was previously not discharged, that the
Appellees had previously filed under [c]hapter 7, and that Appellant’s unsecured claims will receive a [2%]
pro rata payment does not mean that the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the Plan was filed in good faith is
clearly erroneous.” Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
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monthly payments into a retirement account, and to retain all secured assets.213
While the Code otherwise authorizes this approach, the court clarified,
“Achieving an appropriate balance between payment of unsecured creditors
and saving retirement funds is the natural end of viewing the totality of
[d]ebtor’s circumstances.”214 This language strongly suggests, if not expressly
states, that neither the 0% repayment nor the retirement account contributions
alone would be sufficient for the court to find bad faith. In this particular
circumstance, this case coded for two factors: Factor 1 and the debtor’s budget
proposal (Factor 8).215 In another case, Factor 1 and fairness to creditors
(Factor 12) were coded when the debtor’s plan “provides for inconsistent
treatment of similarly situated creditors in that it would allow an apparently
undersecured mortgage creditor to receive a full cure of its undersecured claim
while other unsecured creditors receive a de minimis payment.”216
2. Substantial Repayment Above the § 1325(a)(4) “Best Interests of
Creditors” (“Factor 2”)
As previously discussed, the amount of unsecured debt repayment relative
to a chapter 7 liquidation was particularly relevant to good faith analysis prior
to the enactment of § 1325(b) in 1984.217 Section 1325(b) requires all projected
disposable income to go toward the plan during the applicable commitment
period.218 Nevertheless, retaining Factor 2 as well as pre-1984 cases is
important to capture the development of chapter 13 good faith analysis over
time. This study coded for Factor 2 even in post-1984 cases when the court
clearly referred to § 1325(a)(4) in its good faith analysis.219
213 In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that a chapter 13 “plan that
proposes to pay 0% to creditors when a debtor could pay substantially more is not a plan proposed in good
faith”).
214 Id. at 869.
215 As another example of coding for Factor 1 and Factor 8, see In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL
2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012) (finding bad faith in a fee-only plan involving nearly $200,000
of general unsecured debt where the debtor proposed to retain a vacation time share through monthly payments
of $480, and noting that “chapter 13 is . . . a bargain between debtors and creditors” and that the plan “tilts so
dramatically in the debtors’ favor as to cause the plan to fail the test of good faith”).
216 In re Namie, 395 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). Notwithstanding payment of the entire
unsecured portion of the mortgage claim, the total repayment on general unsecured claims was only 1%. Id. at
596.
217 See supra Part I.C.1.
218 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).
219 See, e.g., Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 322 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (listing “unsecured creditors would
receive the same dividend they would have if the case had been filed as a Chapter 7,” as a factor that favored
plan confirmation).
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3. Plan Duration (“Factor 3”)
Section 1322(d) provides that a chapter 13 plan’s duration may not be
longer than either three or five years, depending on whether the income of the
debtor and debtor’s spouse is above or below median income.220 Within these
constraints, the ultimate length of a debtor’s plan can be discretionary.221
Courts consider this factor as a measure of the debtor’s genuine willingness to
produce a fair repayment to creditors, especially if the plan duration is directly
tied to the attorney fees.222 While wording may vary, this factor is uniformly
used and straightforwardly applied across courts providing a factor lists.223
This study coded for Factor 3 whenever the court discussed the plan
duration’s effect on good faith, unless the court merely stated the statutory
applicable commitment period for a given plan.224 For example, this study
coded for Factor 3 when a court stated, “If unsecured creditors are only going
to receive 5%, an unmeaningful recovery, a good faith issue arises for the
debtor unless the debtor extends the recovery period to five years making the
recovery for unsecured creditors more meaningful.”225 Cases with early
termination language, as discussed in Part II of this Comment, were coded for
Factor 3.226
4. The Amount, Nature, and Type of General Unsecured Debts (“Factor
4”)
Phrasings of Factor 4 in court taxonomies include “the type of debt sought
to be discharged and whether any such debt is nondischargeable in [c]hapter
7”;227 “the circumstances under which the debt was incurred”;228 “the nature
220

11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
See supra Part II.A.1.
222 E.g., In re Lavilla, 425 B.R. 572, 578–79 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2010) (citing In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 56,
59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008)). See also supra Part II.A.1.
223 See Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he expected
duration of the [c]hapter 13 plan . . . .”); Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d
885, 888 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he probable or expected duration of the debtor’s [c]hapter 13 plan . . . .”);
Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he period of time payment will be
made . . . .”).
224 But see In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59, 63–64 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995). In this case the objecting creditors
put the plan’s duration at issue under the good faith standard, and the court discussed the merits of the
objection by turning to the statutory requirements for plan duration. Id. at 63–64. In this circumstance, the
study coded for Factor 3.
225 In re Williams, 231 B.R. 280, 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) (emphasis added).
226 See supra Part II.A.1.
227 United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
221
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and amount of unsecured claims”;229 “how the debt arose”;230 and “the debtor’s
[prepetition] conduct that gave rise to the debts.”231 Courts announce these
concepts both independently and as part of the same factor; however, courts
within the same jurisdiction may separate or combine the concepts in later
cases.232 This study combined these concepts into one factor given their
commonality. Courts’ phrasings of both factors pertain to the characteristics of
the specific general unsecured debts in the case, such as the total amount and
whether they are dischargeable in chapter 7.
Coding for this factor included discussion of the debtor’s prepetition
behavior, such as debtors who sought to discharge debt from a fraudulent
mortgage scheme.233 Fraudulently obtained debt is a common occurrence in
chapter 13 good faith cases.234 One might think that fraud alone likely weighs
toward a finding of bad faith. But courts occasionally reach a contrary result
when other circumstances favorable to the debtor are present. For example, one
court ruled in favor of a debtor who proposed to pay only $20,000 of a
$267,000 court judgment arising from fraudulent behavior while serving in a
fiduciary capacity.235 The court explained, “There is no question that [the
debtor’s behavior] was deplorable . . . [but] this consideration alone, however,
is not sufficient to defeat [the debtor’s] plan.”236 After noting that Congress
had allowed certain debts to be nondischargeable in chapter 7 but
dischargeable in chapter 13, the court stated, “What is required is that the plan
must be proposed in good faith, not that the debt was incurred in good
faith.”237 The study coded for Factor 4 in this case.

228

Barrett, 964 F.2d at 592.
Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982).
230 In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992).
231 Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).
232 See In re Ault, 271 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2002) (citations omitted). The court announced as
separate factors the types of debt sought to be discharged and also whether a debt would be non-dischargeable
in chapter 7. Id. Yet, the Eighth Circuit cases to which it attributes these two factors actually treat them as one.
Estus, 695 F.2d at 317; Ault, 271 B.R. at 620 (citing Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346,
1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).
233 In re Weiser, 391 B.R. 902, 909–10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (discussing at length the origin of debt
from a mortgage scheme in which the debtors were probably participating, but at least behaving “recklessly”).
234 See, e.g., In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (finding bad faith where “nearly all of
the Debtor’s pre-[c]hapter 7 nondischargeable debt arose from his fraudulent actions; claims on which he now
proposes to pay only a minimal dividend”).
235 In re Smith 286 F.3d 461, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2002).
236 Id. at 467.
237 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
229
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5. Debtor’s Past Bankruptcy Filings (“Factor 5”)
Phrasings for Factor 5 include “debtor’s past bankruptcy filings”238 and
“the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act.”239 This study coded for Factor 5 when, for example, a court
discussed the debtor’s current ineligibility for chapter 7 due to a recent
discharge, thereby forcing the debtor into chapter 13.240 When the subsequent
chapter 13 filing is a fee-only plan, courts have expressed concern that this
behavior undermines the Code’s timeline for successive filings.241
Previous filings have always played a role in good faith assessments,
especially prior dismissals.242 Debtors often use multiple bankruptcy chapters
in sophisticated ways. A common example is a so-called “chapter 20” case,243
when a debtor files for chapter 13 relief after a chapter 7 discharge and the
debtor seeks, for example, to “strip off” a wholly unsecured junior lien on his
primary residence.244 Chapter 20’s usefulness has been limited by BAPCPA,

238

See Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).
See Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted).
240 See, e.g., In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 54–55, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that two consolidated
cases—each involving previous chapter 7 discharges—were, “[r]educed to their cores . . . two cases with
debtors ineligible for [c]hapter 7 discharges seeking another round of debt forgiveness”).
241 See, e.g., id. at 59–60 (citations omitted) (“These cases, basically [c]hapter 7 cases hidden within
[c]hapter 13 petitions, blur the distinction between the chapters into a meaningless haze. To allow them to go
forward would, in effect, judicially invalidate § 727(a)(8)’s requirement of an eight year hiatus between
[c]hapter 7 discharges and replace it with either the four year break required by § 1328(f)(1), or the two year
gap mandated by § 1328(f)(2).”).
242 See In re Hurt, 369 B.R. 274, 281–82 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007) (finding bad faith when two previous
chapter 13 filings were dismissed due to default); In re Thornes, 386 B.R. 903, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007)
(finding bad faith in third chapter 13 filing when debtor failed to show a substantial change in conditions after
previous two cases were dismissed).
243 “Chapter 20” refers generally to successive filings of 1) a chapter 7 plan and 2) a subsequent chapter
13 plan “to further restructure secured debt”—often in the form of lien stripping—or deal with debt that is
nondischargeable in chapter 7 but is dischargeable in chapter 13. Lawrence Ponoroff, Hey the Sun Is Hot and
the Water’s Fine: Why Not Strip Off That Lien?, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 17 n.18 (2013). See also In re
Cushman, 217 B.R. 470, 473, 476–78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (citation omitted) (describing chapter 20 as “a
chapter 13 case brought while the ink on the debtor’s chapter 7 discharge is just barely dry,” and finding bad
faith when, during chapter 7 proceedings, the debtor converted a car lease into an installment purchase
agreement, secured by the car, and then filed for chapter 13 months later to strip down the lien—that is,
discharge the unsecured portion of the debt).
244 See, e.g., Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 184–86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). See generally
Ponoroff, supra note 243 (providing a thorough analysis of lien stripping in bankruptcy).
239
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which added § 1328(f) to address the effect of past filings on obtaining a
chapter 13 discharge.245
This study does not include chapter 20 cases when the debtor is ineligible
for a chapter 13 discharge under § 1328(f), but nevertheless files to strip off a
wholly unsecured junior lien. These cases raise special concerns, including an
unresolved split in case law.246 To the extent that their inclusion may change
this study’s analysis, the most likely effect would be to increase the frequency
in which courts discuss Factor 5 and Factor 12 (fairness to creditors).
Otherwise, this study includes chapter 20247 and “veiled chapter 7”248 cases and
likely coded for Factor 5 in each.
6. Debtor’s Honesty and Accuracy of Schedules and Statements (“Factor
6”)
Misrepresentations in bankruptcy filing schedules, or other acts of
dishonesty during the judicial process, weigh heavily on a court’s evaluation of
good faith, even before the enactment of the modern Code.249 After BAFJA
and BAPCPA, many courts suggested that the income-based factors are less
important and instead focused on indications of dishonesty.250 Factor 6 has
many phrasings but generally pertains to any attempt to mislead the court or
creditors through inaccuracies in the statements and schedules filed during the
case.251 One court noted that good faith may be ambiguous but “certainly

245 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2012) (rendering chapter 13 debtors ineligible for a discharge if they received a
discharge under chapters 7, 11, or 12 within four years prior to filing a chapter 13 petition).
246 See Bryan J. Hall, Stripping Liens to Save Their Homes: Debtors’ Options to Reduce Mortgage Debt
in Bankruptcy, FED. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 56 (discussing the split) (citing Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette),
455 B.R. 177, 185–86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011) (in a chapter 20 case, holding that modifying a wholly unsecured
lien in chapter 13 is not conditioned on eligibility for a discharge); In re Orkwis, 457 B.R. 243, 250 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (in a chapter 20 case, holding that a wholly unsecured lien may not be avoided in chapter 13
unless the debtor receives a discharge in the chapter 13 case)).
247 In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 267 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (citations omitted).
248 Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 319 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citation omitted).
249 See Johnson, supra note 98, at 378–79.
250 See In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson),
346 B.R. 256, 261-62 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
251 In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992) (listing “whether the debtor has been forthcoming
with the bankruptcy court and the creditors”); Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th
Cir. 2001) (listing “the accuracy of the plan’s statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repayment of
unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court”) (quoting United States v.
Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982)); In re Ault, 271 B.R. 617, 619-20 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
2002) (listing “whether the debtor has accurately stated his debts and expenses on his bankruptcy statements
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does . . . require ‘honesty of intention.’”252 The study coded for Factor 6
discussion is based on the following language:
The debtor has not been forthcoming with the [c]ourt or the [c]hapter
13 trustee regarding his income and expenses. The debtor’s
statements regarding his fiancée’s contributions to his household
income have been inconsistent, and the [c]ourt did not find his
253
testimony at the confirmation hearing to be credible on this issue.

The court followed this with details on the inaccuracies it saw in the
debtor’s forms and schedules.254 In a more subtle example—and one that
pointed towards a finding of good faith—this study coded for Factor 6 when
the court stated, “[The debtor] has accurately stated his debts, assets and
liabilities and, in this regard, has been forthcoming with the court.”255
7. Debtor’s Special Circumstances (“Factor 7”)
While Puffer may open the door to a separate “special circumstances”
analysis specifically for fee-only plans,256 courts have always analyzed special
circumstances in chapter 13 good faith analysis, such as unanticipated health
care expenses.257 While “special circumstances” may suggest this is a broad,
catch-all factor, courts typically do not face much litigation over good faith
(fee-only plans or otherwise) where such circumstances exist, perhaps because
adverse parties do not raise the objection when a clear debtor hardship is
present.
This study coded for Factor 7 based on reference to special or exigent
circumstances. A common example of Factor 7 discussion coding occurs when
a court notes a lack of special circumstances that would justify a fee-only plan,
such as the following: “[n]either is there any evidence that the [d]ebtors were

and schedules” and “whether the debtor has made any fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the case
to mislead the Bankruptcy Court or his creditors”).
252 Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Barnes
v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
253 In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
254 Id.
255 In re Ristic, 142 B.R. 856, 860 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992); see also id. at 860 n.3.
256 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012).
257 See Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Corino, 191 B.R. 283, 289
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (listing medical costs as an example of special circumstances in the court’s list of
factors).
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facing any exigency, such as the loss of a home or a car, which would render
them unable to save the amount of counsel fees over a period of time.”258
8. Debtor’s Budget Proposal (“Factor 8”)
Factor 8 differs from Factor 6 (debtor’s honesty and accuracy of schedules
and statements), in that it is not an assessment of fraud or misrepresentation,
but of the overall reasonableness of the debtor’s financial plan. In assessing the
overall plan, considerations for reasonableness include current income and
proposed living expenses,259 plan payments relative to the debtor’s overall
finances,260 excluded or exempted assets that might create greater surplus for
creditors,261 and ultimately whether these components result in a fair
distribution to creditors.262 Furthermore, debtors sometimes propose to pay
more than their projected disposable income, which is the only amount
required by statute, such as when the disposable income test results in a
negative value.263 Such an effort could support a finding of good faith but may
not be outcome-determinative.264
As an example, this study coded for Factor 8 based on the following
language:
The debtor provides complete or nearly complete financial support
for his fiancée, and his amended Schedule J shows that he anticipates
spending more than $700 a month on food and recreation. The debtor
leases a new, luxury vehicle for his unemployed fiancée to drive. He
plans to continue paying his fiancée’s expenses and contributing 15%
of his monthly salary to his 401k. The debtor also proposes to

258 In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011); see also In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Absent disability, Debtor’s age . . . or other extenuating circumstances, foregoing or
substantially reducing retirement contributions for the length of the plan is unlikely to unreasonably impair
Debtor’s ability to obtain his fresh start.”).
259 E.g., Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Farmer, 186
B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995).
260 United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he amount of the proposed
payments and the amount of the debtor’s surplus….”).
261 In re Thomas, 443 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (citations omitted).
262 Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he amount of
payment offered by debtor as indicative of the debtor’s sincerity to repay the debt . . . .”).
263 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 437 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
264 Compare In re Spruch, 410 B.R. 839, 840–41, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008) (finding good faith where
the debtor had a statutory disposable income of negative $1,311 but proposed a monthly payment plan of
$1,900), with In re McDonald, 437 B.R. at 280–81, 293 (finding bad faith despite debtor’s statutory disposable
income of negative $1,239 and a proposed monthly payment plan of $5,000 for 60 months).
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continue making direct payments to Sony for his 50″ television set
265
and surround sound system.

In another interesting example of Factor 8 coding, one plan sought to retain a
vacation property while leaving general unsecured creditors with no
repayment:
Here, the debtors propose to pay their unsecured creditors nothing
while retaining a vacation venue costing them at least $314 per
month, net of any rental income they may receive. Redirecting the
funds dedicated to the Disney timeshare to their chapter 13 plan
instead, even after reserving a reasonable monthly allowance for
recreation, would result in a meaningful dividend to unsecured
266
creditors.

9. Debtor’s Employment History and Prospects (“Factor 9”)
The likelihood of a debtor successfully completing a chapter 13 plan rests
on the viability of his future income stream. While the projection of future
disposable income falls within a separate chapter 13 provision,
§ 1325(b)(1)(B),267 courts still look to the debtor’s employment when assessing
good faith.268 Phrasings include “the debtor’s employment history, ability to
earn and likelihood of future increases in income”;269 “the debtor’s ability to
earn and the likelihood of fluctuation in his earnings”;270 and “the debtor’s
employment history and prospects.”271 Like most courts, this study also treats
Factor 9 separately from the debtor’s income, a component of Factor 8.272
265 In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). Unsurprisingly, the court found this plan to
be in bad faith. Id. at 567.
266 In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL 2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012).
267 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012); see Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 509, 524 (2010) (holding
that projecting future disposable income is “forward-looking” and “may account for changes in the debtor’s
income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation”).
268 See In re Dunning, 157 B.R. 51 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding bad faith where self-employed sales
representative’s earnings significantly increased but only proposed a 1% repayment to unsecured creditors); In
re Dos Passos, 45 B.R. 240, 243 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (finding good faith in dentist’s chapter 13 plan where,
“[a]lthough the [10% repayment to unsecured creditors] is low and the debtor is a skilled professional, his past
employment history is not marked by success”).
269 United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
270 Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983).
271 Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982).
272 See, e.g., In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) (applying Factor 8 by stating that the
“[d]ebtor’s monthly surplus is $50, exactly what she is committing to the plan,” and applying Factor 9 by
stating that from the schedules filed, the debtor “did not expect any increases or decreases in income or
expenses,” and that the debtor’s job and age did “not suggest the likelihood of a significant increase in
income”).
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Factor 9 intends to assess the debtor’s ability to earn future income and any
fluctuations that may alter the projection of future income.273 This study coded
for Factor 9 any time a court addressed the debtor’s present or future
employment.274
10. Amount of Attorney’s Fees (“Factor 10”)
BAPCPA addressed fees by establishing more rigid pre-filing standards for
bankruptcy counsel, including disclosing fee amounts.275 In response to
BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts now usually require debtors’ counsel to submit a
fee application that itemizes services rendered for the case.276 Many
jurisdictions have established a “no look” fee concept, where the court allows
an attorney to claim a “presumptively reasonable” fee up to a given amount
without filing a fee application.277 While a presumptively reasonable fee would
seem to pass good faith muster, that is not entirely clear. The reasonableness of
attorney’s fees is often litigated separately from good faith, and the study did
not code for Factor 11 when this occurred.278 The timing of fee payment,
however, may also suggest bad faith if it evidences a debtor’s ability to pay
more into the plan than he proposed.279
Unsurprisingly for a data set comprised of fee-only and low percentage
plans, attorney fees are mentioned frequently in the opinions. The focus of
Factor 10, however, is on the fee amount, not the extent that plan payments are
composed of attorney fees. For this reason, this study only coded for Factor 10
when the fee amount was at issue; furthermore, the amount must have been at
273

See, e.g., id.
E.g., In re Baird, 234 B.R. 546, 553 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“At the confirmation hearing, [d]ebtor
appeared to have regained much of his health and now, according to his testimony and Memorandum, is
hopeful of gaining employment in his area of his expertise in the near future…. [T]he Court finds [d]ebtor in a
position to substantially increase his payment to creditors throughout the life of his plan.”).
275 11 U.S.C. § 528(a) (2012) (stating in part, “[a] debt relief agency shall . . . execute a written contract
with [the debtor] that explains clearly and conspicuously . . . the fees or charges for [services rendered], and
the terms of payment”).
276 Lupica, supra note 56, at 39.
277 Id. at 40; see also Kennedy, Lantin, & Heilig, supra note 68, at 4–6. Nevertheless, courts may still
scrutinize a “presumptively reasonable” fee. See Lupica, supra note 56, at 40–41 & n.58; see also, e.g., In re
Debtor’s Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374 B.R. 903, 906–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (establishing, sua
sponte, a presumptively reasonable fee plan but also allowing any party in interest to object to the fee within
10 days of the fee award).
278 See, e.g., Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012).
279 See In re Steinhorn, 27 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding bad faith where court noted “that
these debtors were able to pay their attorney $1,000 before they filed this petition, more than they propose to
pay all their creditors for the next seven months”).
274
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issue under good faith analysis, not another legal provision pertaining to
fees.280
11. Trustee’s Burden (“Factor 11”)
The most common phrasing of Factor 11 is “the burden which the plan’s
administration would place upon the trustee.”281 This study coded for Factor 11
when plans may pose unique challenges to the trustee.282 While it is very
common in factor lists, Factor 11 rarely arises as a distinct concern in good
faith analysis.283
12. Fairness to Creditors (“Factor 12”)
While a fair distribution of the debtor’s assets to creditors lies at the heart
of any bankruptcy plan, courts have carved out Factor 12 for good faith
analysis. To constitute Factor 12, this study combined several factors from
various courts’ lists, including “the extent of preferential treatment between
classes of creditors”;284 “the extent to which secured claims are modified”;285
“the debtor’s treatment of creditors both before and after the petition was
filed”;286 and “how the debtor’s actions affected creditors.”287 Kull and other
cases list the former two as separate factors in the list.288 While preferential
treatment between creditor classes and modification of secured claims are
distinct concepts, this study chose to combine them into a general category,
partly because courts simply did not discuss modification of secured claims in
the analyzed cases.

280 In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 554–55 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (coding for Factor 10 when the court,
while analyzing the good faith of the plan, notes, “[t]he fees charged by counsel in this case are approximately
twice what would be charged for [c]hapter 7 proceedings for these [d]ebtors”).
281 United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
282 See In re Loper, 367 B.R. 660, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (finding no undue burden on trustee).
283 Only 2 cases in this study’s data set discussed this factor. Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 322 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); In re Lancaster, 280 B.R. 468, 482 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002).
284 Estus, 695 F.2d at 317.
285 Id.
286 In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992).
287 In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007).
288 Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 659 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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13. Debtor’s Motivation (“Factor 13”)
Phrasings for factor 13 include “the motivation and sincerity of the debtor
in seeking [c]hapter 13 relief”;289 “the timing of the petition”;290 “[w]hether the
debtor has unfairly manipulated the [] Code in any aspect of his plan”;291 and
“whether the [c]hapter 13 filing was an attempt to defer or avoid the claims of
legitimate creditors.”292 Factor 13 is especially susceptible to conceptual
overlap with other factors as well as the foundational inquiry of good faith
analysis: whether the proposal is an “abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit”
of chapter 13.293 Courts, however, do examine the factor separately,294 and
trustees often cite Factor 13 when raising their good faith objections.295 For
example, this study coded for Factor 13 based on the following language: “The
sole and overriding purpose of this [b]ankruptcy is to discharge an otherwise
nondischargeable debt. [A single claim] represents 100% of the unsecured
debt. This motivation and intention to escape nearly all liability of this debt
hardly comports with the true ‘spirit and purpose’ of [c]hapter 13.”296
The following is another example where the study coded for Factor 13:
“The bottom line is whether the debtor is attempting to thwart his creditors, or
is making an honest effort to repay them to the best of his ability. There is little
doubt that the [d]ebtors are attempting to manipulate the [] Code to ‘thwart’
this one [c]reditor.”297
D. Results
This Subsection presents the results of the empirical analysis. This study
examined four possible sets of predictors in litigation under the good faith
289 Estus, 695 F.2d at 317; see also Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d
885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983) (almost identical).
290 Love, 957 F.2d at 1357.
291 In re Wilcox, 251 B.R. 59, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (citation omitted).
292 In re Vick, 327 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
293 Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
294 See, e.g., In re Zellmer, 465 B.R. 517, 524–25 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting first that the central focus of good faith analysis is whether the plan is an “abuse of the
provisions, purpose or spirit of [c]hapter 13,” then listing “whether [the debtor] has unfairly manipulated the []
Code” as a factor, and finally applying that factor to the case).
295 See Meyer v. Lepe (In re Lepe), 470 B.R. 851, 858–59 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
296 In re Jacobs, 102 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988) (quoting In re Sanders, 28 B.R. 917, 922
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
297 In re Dicey, 312 B.R. 456, 460 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Virden, 279 B.R. 401, 409
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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standards of § 1325(a)(3) and (7). This study seeks to determine 1) if the
percentage repayment to general unsecured creditors is a statistically
significant predictor of a finding of good faith, as compared to low percentage
plans with repayment of greater than 2%; 2) if the number of listed or
discussed factors in a courts’ totality of the circumstances test is a statistically
significant predictor of a finding of good faith; 3) if the listing or discussion of
any single factor is a statistically significant predictor of a finding of good
faith; and 4) if any combination of listed or discussed factors occurs at a
statistically significant rate. As a preliminary matter, the courts reached a
finding of good faith in 26% of the 61 cases in the data set.
With respect to the first set of predictors, the general unsecured creditor
repayment is not statistically significant to a finding of good faith in the data
set. Regarding the second set of predictors, neither the number of factors
discussed nor the number of factors listed in a case are statistically significant
to a finding of good faith in the data set.
However, the difference between the number of listed factors and discussed
factors is a statistically significant predictor of a good faith finding. Using a
logistic regression model, as the number of factors discussed in a case
decreases in relation to the number of factors listed in a case, the odds of the
court finding good faith decreases at a statistically significant rate (p = 0.019).
For each additional unit of increase in the difference (i.e., each time a court
discusses one less factor than it lists), the odds of a good faith finding decrease
by a factor of 0.78. Table 1 depicts this model:
Table 1: Logistic Regression Model for Good Faith Finding
Independent Variable

Odds Ratio

Difference in Number of Listed and Discussed Factors

0.779* (0.632, 0.960)

Note: N = 61. * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratio presented with 95% confidence interval in
parentheses.298
For example, if a court lists twelve factors and discusses two factors rather
than three, the odds of the court finding good faith decreases by 22.1%.299
Although measuring judges’ subjective decision-making quantitatively has
298
299

This means that with 95% certainty, the odds ratio could be as low as 0.632 and as high as 0.960.
With 95% certainty, this figure could be as low as 1.4% and as high as 31.3%.
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limitations, the study’s results suggest that judges do narrow their focus when
finding a fee-only or low-percentage plan to be in bad faith. One might say this
also suggests the converse: judges cast a broader net to justify good faith in a
fee-only plan.300
Overall, the data show much less correlation than hypothesized. The result
is nevertheless insightful, and Part IV provides further discussion. The
remainder of this Subsection discusses each statistically significant relationship
with respect to the third and fourth sets of predictors.
1. Significant Relationships Between Factors and a Finding of Good Faith
A statistically significant relationship (at the 10% level) exists between a
discussion of Factor 2 (substantial repayment above the § 1325(a)(4) standard)
and a finding of good faith. Of the opinions analyzed, 26% found the plan to be
in good faith. Thus, in the absence of a relationship, one would expect to find
the same percentage of good faith findings in opinions that discuss Factor 2.
However, 75% of opinions discussing Factor 2 also found good faith, and
opinions that did not discuss Factor 2 only found good faith 22% of the time.
Only one of the opinions discussing Factor 2 was decided after BAFJA.301
Table 2 depicts this relationship.
TABLE 2: Relationship Between Discussing Factor 2 and Finding Good Faith
Factor 2 discussion –
substantial repayment
above the § 1325(a)(4) “best
interests of creditors” test
Not Discussed

No

Good Faith Finding
Yes

44
(77.19%)
Discussed
1
(25.00%)
Total
45
(73.77%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The
Fisher’s exact test is 0.052.

13
(22.81%)
3
(75.00%)
16
(26.23%)
p-value from a

Total

57
(100%)
4
(100%)
61
(100%)
two-sided

300 One possible limitation to this conclusion occurs when a court chooses to discuss all the good faith
factors as a matter of course. However, this was a rare occurrence in this study’s data set.
301 See Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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A statistically significant relationship also exists between a listing of Factor
7 (a debtor’s special circumstances) and a finding of good faith. Just as before,
in the absence of such a relationship, one would expect courts to find good
faith for cases that list Factor 7 at the same rate that they find good faith for the
entire set of analyzed cases (i.e., 26.2%). However, cases that list Factor 7
found good faith only 12.0% of the time, and cases that did not list Factor 7
found good faith 36.1% of the time. Table 2 depicts this relationship.
Of the four cases that listed Factor 7 and found good faith, only one also
discussed Factor 7.302 This supports the Puffer court’s guidance that fee-only
plans should only be allowed when special circumstances exist, which will be
“relatively rare.”303 However, of the twenty-four cases that listed Factor 7 and
did not find good faith, only six cases also discussed Factor 7. All six cases
found the debtor to lack special circumstances weighing in favor of good
faith.304 Thus, the negative influence of listing Factor 7 on a finding of good
faith may have little practical significance. Perhaps it suggests that before they
reject a debtor’s plan for lack of good faith, courts tend to ensure that no
exigent circumstances exist that would justify a small repayment to general
unsecured creditors.
TABLE 3: Relationship Between Listing Factor 7 and Finding Good Faith
Factor 7 listing – Debtor’s
Special Circumstances

Good Faith Finding
No
Yes
Total
Not Listed
23
13
36
(63.89%)
(36.11%)
(100%)
Listed
22
3
25
(88.00%)
(12.00%)
(100%)
Total
45
16
61
(73.77%)
(26.23%)
(100%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square
test with one degree of freedom is 0.035.
302 In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 829 & n.11 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) (finding this factor to support good
faith where “[t]here appear to be no special circumstances driving this filing (other than the collection action);
the cost of caring for the grandson appears to be a relatively small incremental one over what would be [the]
[d]ebtor’s expenses for herself”).
303 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012).
304 Ingram, 482 B.R. at 323; In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011); In re McDonald,
437 B.R. 278, 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); In re Pearson, 398 B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2008); In re
Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Lancaster. 280 B.R. 468, 482 (W.D. Mo. 2002).
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2. Significant Relationships Between Factors Discussed in the Same Case
A statistically significant relationship exists between discussion of Factor 9
(the debtor’s employment history and prospects) and three other factors. First,
Factor 9 discussion is a significant predictor of a discussion of Factor 3 (plan
duration). Factor 3 was discussed in approximately 23.0% of the analyzed
cases, and in the absence of a relationship, one would expect to find the same
percentage in cases that discuss both Factor 3 and Factor 9. However, analyzed
cases that discuss Factor 9 also discuss Factor 3 approximately 71.4% of the
time, and cases that did not discuss Factor 9 only discussed Factor 3
approximately 16.7% of the time. Table 3 depicts this relationship.
TABLE 4: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 3
Factor 9 – Debtor’s
Employment History &
Prospects
Not Discussed

Factor 3 – Plan Duration
Not Discussed
Discussed
Total

45
9
54
(83.33%)
(16.67%)
(100%)
Discussed
2
5
7
(28.57%)
(71.43%)
(100%)
47
14
61
Total
(77.05%)
(22.95%)
(100%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided
Fisher’s exact test is 0.005.

Next, Factor 9 discussion was a significant predictor of a discussion of
Factor 5 (past bankruptcy filings). Factor 5 was discussed in approximately
23.0% of the analyzed cases, and in the absence of a relationship, one would
expect to again find the same percentages in cases that discuss both Factor 5
and Factor 9. However, in the analyzed cases that also discuss Factor 9,
approximately 71.4% of those discuss Factor 5. Analyzed cases that did not
discuss Factor 9 only discussed Factor 5 approximately 16.7% of the time.
Table 4 depicts this relationship.
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TABLE 5: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 5
Factor 9 – Debtor’s
Employment History &
Prospects
Not Discussed

Factor 5 – Past Filings
Not Discussed
Discussed

Total

45
9
54
(83.33%)
(16.67%)
(100%)
2
5
7
Discussed
(28.57%)
(71.43%)
(100%)
47
14
61
Total
(77.05%)
(22.95%)
(100%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided
Fisher’s exact test is 0.005.

Finally, Factor 9 discussion was a significant predictor of a discussion of
Factor 11 (fairness to creditors). Factor 11 was discussed in 9.8% of the
analyzed cases, but was discussed in approximately 57.1% of the analyzed
cases that also discussed Factor 9. Analyzed cases that did not discuss Factor 9
only discussed Factor 11 approximately 3.7% of the time. Table 5 depicts this
relationship.
TABLE 6: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 11
Factor 9 – Debtor’s
Employment History &
Prospects
Not Discussed

Factor 11 – Fairness to Creditors
Not Discussed
Discussed
Total

52
2
54
(96.30%)
(3.70%)
(100%)
Discussed
3
4
7
(42.86%)
(57.14%)
(100%)
Total
55
6
61
(90.16%)
(9.84%)
(100%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided
Fisher’s exact test is 0.001.

One could draw several conclusions from the correlation between Factor 9
and the three other factors. When a debtor proposes little or no payment to
general unsecured creditors, a court may look to the debtor’s employment
prospects to determine whether fluctuations in the debtor’s income are likely.
Again, the projected disposable income test is the statutory requirement for
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repayment,305 but the extent to which the debtor attempts to hide or downplay
such fluctuations in his disposable income prior to confirmation reflects on the
debtor’s good faith in proposing and filing the plan. Seven cases either discuss
Factor 9 and Factor 3, or Factor 9 and Factor 5. In both circumstances, six of
the seven cases found bad faith. The correlation between employment
prospects and past filings seems to reflect cases in which debtors file for
chapter 13 after receiving a recent chapter 7 discharge.306
A statistically significant relationship also exists between Factor 6 (the
debtor’s honesty and the accuracy of schedules and statements) and Factor 4
(the total debt and nature of the debt). Factor 4 was discussed in approximately
36.1% of the analyzed cases. However, analyzed cases that discussed Factor 6
also discussed Factor 4 approximately 72.2% of the time, and analyzed cases
that did not discuss Factor 6 only discussed Factor 4 approximately 20.9% of
the time. Table 6 depicts this relationship. This correlation suggests that courts,
when examining cases with wrongfully-obtained debt or nondischargeable debt
in chapter 7, look especially to the debtor’s behavior during chapter 13
proceedings to assess the debtor’s honesty and willingness to be forthright with
the court.
TABLE 7: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 6 and 4
Factor 6 – Debtor’s
Honesty & Accuracy of
Schedules & Statements
Not Discussed

Factor 4 – Total, Nature, and Type of
General Unsecured Debts
Not Discussed
Discussed
Total
34
9
43
(79.07%)
(20.93%)
(100%)
Discussed
5
13
18
(27.78%)
(72.22%)
(100%)
Total
39
22
61
(63.93%)
(36.07%)
(100%)
Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square
test with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001.

305

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).
See, e.g., In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (discussing Factor 9 and Factor 5 in a
chapter 13 plan seeking to discharge debt that was nondischargeable in a recent chapter 7 case).
306
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IV. DISCUSSION
This Part begins by discussing the study’s findings within the context of the
current judicial landscape and the relative benefits of bright-line or
discretionary rules for fee-only plans. Then, this Part will discuss two possible
modifications for fee-only plans in light of the study’s findings, theoretical
backdrop, and the Puffer decision. This Part does not intend to overstate the
significance of the empirical analysis. Attaching empirical data to a subjective
standard is difficult, particularly within the very specific context of fee-only
plans. Rather, this Part offers general thoughts on how courts might approach
the fee-only issue in the future.
A. Muddy Versus Bright-Line Rules
So far, three circuits have rejected a bright-line standard for fee-only plans,
notwithstanding the Puffer court’s more focused approach of determining
whether the debtor’s special circumstances sufficiently support a finding of
good faith.307 Whether courts should adhere to a bright-line rule or adopt a
more discretionary approach hinges on, among other considerations, the
purpose of the standard and the competency of judges to make informed
decisions.308 Murky standards requiring fact-intensive, case-specific judicial
determinations often encounter criticism and resistance.309 But Congress has
repeatedly declined to further articulate the chapter 13 good faith provision;

307 See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re
Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675–77 (5th Cir. 2012).
308 See generally Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2001) (citing Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)) (discussing bright-line and discretionary rules in bankruptcy law in light of factors
such as judicial competency).
309 See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MILL, CORPORATIONS
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 213–14 (11th ed. 2010) (discussing the
criticism of the vague standard for corporate veil-piercing cases, for which some courts have articulated
multiple factors to consider).
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thus, the legislative intent to maintain a murky standard seems clear.310
Accordingly, courts have made clear that the test is ambiguous and flexible.311
Ted Janger’s research offers support for the flexible standard.312 Janger
compared the use of bright-line (“crystalline”) and discretionary (“muddy”)
standards in bankruptcy law.313 He concluded that regardless of the level of
competence one assumes in a judge, the “muddy” rules have merit.314 Janger
also explored research that suggests good faith clauses in contracts promote
optimal levels of cooperation better than an alternative bright-line rule.315
Janger found that this analysis has merit in business bankruptcies, where
insolvent creditors act collectively to dismantle an insolvent debtor.316
However, consumer bankruptcy is less about preserving an ongoing
relationship between parties and more of a one-time transaction, often with
lower stakes than a business bankruptcy.317 Furthermore, complying with the
chapter 13 good faith standard is the sole responsibility of the debtor and
usually does not require negotiation with creditors or the trustee. The chapter
13 debtor must weigh the benefits of a particular plan proposal against the risk
of encountering an objection to confirmation under § 1325(a)(3) or (7).318
310 See In re Mathis, No. 12-05618-8, 2013 WL 153833, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013)
(discussing Congress’s silence on defining “good faith” in the chapter 13 statute); In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 20
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (quoting Keach v. Boyajian (In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851, 856 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000))
(noting the lack of a definition, courts’ varying approaches to interpretation, and that “Congress presumably
used the phrase ‘good faith’ in its ordinary sense”), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo (In re Buck),
No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D. Mass. April 2, 2014).
311 Alt v. United States (In re Alt), 305 F.3d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); In re Thomas,
443 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983)).
312 See generally Janger, supra note 308, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559.
313 See id.
314 Id. at 564–65.
315 Id. at 603–04 (citing Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994)). Hadfield’s research suggests that in absence of an express term in a
contract, parties tend to operate at a suboptimal level of cooperation, because the individual costs of
cooperation outweigh the shared benefits. Good faith clauses try to solve this problem by promoting a more
optimal level of effort by introducing the risk of liability under the standard. Since they lack full information,
judges are unable to identify the optimal level of effort for a given contract. Thus, instead of judicial searching
for a bright-line rule, a muddy good faith standard promotes efficiency across “a broader range of contractual
types and reduce[s] the costs associated with overcompliance.” Id.
316 Id. at 604.
317 Id. at 596–98.
318 For the trustee and creditors, the likely calculus is comparing the litigation costs to the value of raising
the objection. Assuming the trustee or creditor prevails, the value ranges from forcing the debtor to amend the
plan, which may provide for an only slightly greater repayment, to effectively barring a discharge altogether.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5) (2012) (on objection from the trustee or any party in interest, allowing the court to
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While he did not discuss good faith provisions in bankruptcy law, Janger
prescribed muddy standards in consumer bankruptcy where one expects
abuse.319 Since curbing abuse in the bankruptcy system is the hallmark of the
good faith provisions, Janger’s prescription suggests that good faith analysis
should remain muddy.320 A muddy standard is also favorable to a per se
approach because fee-only plans raise a particularly strong suspicion of
abuse.321 This study offers some support for this proposition because the
findings suggest that courts are using the totality of the circumstances test to its
fullest extent. Given that only one of thirteen factors that the study coded for
discussion was significantly correlated with a finding of good faith, courts
seem to be deciding fee-only cases based on various factors. In light of this
finding, is there a need to modify the totality of the circumstances approach to
good faith analysis for fee-only plans?
One option of course is to retain the test. While courts usually find fee-only
plans to be in bad faith, Crager reminds us that these plans may still satisfy
good faith given the debtor’s particular circumstances.322 Crager reaches this
conclusion without modifying the totality of the circumstances test or taking a
per se approach.323 This study may provide support for this approach, first with
its finding that the general unsecured repayment is not a significant predictor
of good faith, which suggests that bad faith requires something more than zero
or nominal repayment. Second, despite all of the possible correlations between
factor discussion and good faith, or between combinations of factors discussed,
this study found relatively few that were statistically significant. Finally, while
the data does demonstrate that courts tend to narrow their factor discussion
when finding bad faith, judges did not focus on any particular set of factors.

dismiss the case or convert to chapter 7 if confirmation is denied for any reason under § 1325, which includes
for lack of good faith). Although, the Code provides the debtor with a broad right to convert the case to a
chapter 7 proceeding, which if approved by the court, will likely result in a discharge. See id. § 1307(a).
319 Janger, supra note 308, at 601.
320 See Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting 9
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9.20 at 319 (14th ed. 1978)) (following other circuits by defining good faith as a
provision where “[a] comprehensive definition of good faith is not practical . . . the basic inquiry should be
whether or not under the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit
of [the Chapter] in the proposal or plan”).
321 See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012); In re Barnes, No. 1206613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *10 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013).
322 Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675, 677 (5th Cir. 2012).
323 Id. at 675–77.
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The remainder of this Part discusses two other possible modifications to
good faith analysis in fee-only plans: follow the Puffer special circumstances
approach or issue a sua sponte order for fee-only plans.
B. A Modified Approach
Recall that the First Circuit’s opinion in Puffer may be read (on remand,
the bankruptcy court did) to adopt a modified approach to fee-only plans:
requiring the debtor to show special circumstances that sufficiently indicate
good faith.324 Whether or not this is what the court actually meant—versus
merely indicating that special circumstances was the most important factor in
the totality of the circumstances test325—such a modified approach may make
sense. After all, the study found very little correlation between the good faith
of fee-only plans and any specific variable, despite the fact that most fee-only
plans are found in bad faith.326
Requiring the debtor to affirmatively show special circumstances creates an
extra hurdle for fee-only plans and moves in the direction of a more
“crystalline” rule. One might consider this to be a “good faith-plus”
approach:327 before a court applies the traditional totality of the circumstances
test for good faith, a fee-only plan debtor must make an additional showing of
special circumstances. This approach may strike an appropriate balance
between preserving a “muddy” standard and providing a clearer presumption
against plans courts usually view as abusive.
Also, recall that this Comment suggests the modified-approach reading of
Puffer is similar to the rebuttable presumption provisions in chapter 7, where
the debtor may rebut the presumption of abuse found under the means test by
showing special circumstances.328 The two are not completely analogous, but
the resemblance is noteworthy. Just as showing sufficient circumstances to
rebut the abuse presumption is difficult and infrequent,329 justifying a fee-only
324

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
326 Only 26% of the total cases in this study’s data set passed the good faith test. See also supra note 79.
327 This term is merely illustrative and, to the author’s knowledge, has not been used in this context
anywhere else.
328 Supra notes 164–64 and accompanying text.
329 Anthony P. Cali, Note, The “Special Circumstance” of Student Loan Debt Under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2010) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that many courts describe the special circumstances of
§ 707(b)(2)(B) as “effectively off limits for most debtors” and “uncommon, unusual, exceptional, distinct,
325
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plan with special circumstances, Puffer tells us, will be “relatively rare.”330 The
legislative intent behind the chapter 7 abuse rebuttal provision is to provide an
exception to the means test for “debtors whose special circumstances require
adjustments to income or expenses that place them in dire need of chapter 7
relief.”331 Showing special circumstances to justify fee-only plans would
presumably serve a very similar purpose: because of his special circumstances,
the debtor is in dire need of chapter 13 relief, and thus an otherwise abusive
fee-only plan is justifiable. Such a rule shifts the burden to the debtor to
affirmatively present special circumstances.
In response to the modified approach, a debtor proposing would have
several options: (1) affirmatively show special circumstances; (2) propose a
higher repayment to general unsecured creditors (perhaps while also showing
special circumstances); or (3) do not file for chapter 13 relief. These responses
have potential benefits: (1) they promote higher repayment to general
unsecured creditors; (2) courts use fewer resources when litigating plans that
are likely to be abusive; and (3) courts have more complete information about
the debtor’s particular circumstances.
This approach could be implemented in two ways. The first is through
judicial precedent, like the Puffer decision (again, if it is indeed adopting a
modified approach). With judicial precedent, fee-only plans would only be
subjected to this modified rule when a party objects to the plan on good faith
grounds, or during the court’s review of the plan at the confirmation stage.
Knowing that the plan is even more likely to fail under a modified approach,
this implementation could serve as a powerful deterrent from filing fee-only
plans in the first place.
The second implementation is through a sua sponte order, which courts
have similarly used for to implement the presumptively reasonable, or “nolook,” fee scheme for attorney compensation.332 This order might state that a
fee-only plan is presumptively in bad faith (or unreasonable), in violation of
peculiar, particular, additional or extra conditions or facts”); Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 802–03 (2007).
330 Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012).
331 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 7 (1999) (report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); see also Cali,
supra note 329, at 485 (discussing the legislative history of § 707(b)(2)(B)).
332 See Lupica, supra note 56, at 40. Nevertheless, courts may still scrutinize a “presumptively
reasonable” fee. Id. at 40–41 & n. 58; see also, e.g., In re Debtor’s Attorney’s Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374
B.R. 903, 903, 906–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (establishing, sua sponte, a presumptively reasonable fee plan,
but also allowing any party in interest to object to the fee within ten days of the fee award).
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§ 1325(a)(3) and § 1325(a)(7), and requires debtor to list special
circumstances. Compared to implementation through judicial precedent, a sua
sponte order provides more procedural clarity and may be an even stronger
deterrent from filing a fee-only plan, as the order firmly assigns the debtor with
the burden of showing special circumstances, regardless of whether an
objection is raised.
C. Challenges to Implementing a Modified Approach
Regardless of how it is implemented, a modified approach in practice does
become more of a bright-line rule, and as such, presents challenges. Creating a
modified approach for fee-only plans under the good faith provisions—
whether through case law or a sua sponte order—begs the question of what
qualifies as a fee-only plan. Although the precise line is far from clear now,
adopting a modified rule would likely bring this issue to the forefront, as
debtors may seek to avoid the rule by arguing their plan does not qualify as
fee-only. Would a court draw a somewhat arbitrary line at a 2% or less
repayment to unsecured creditors, as this study did for empirical analysis
purposes? What if, instead, the court defines fee-only in terms of the
percentage of total plan payments that fund attorney fees? Regarding the latter,
what should be the threshold percentage to qualify as a fee-only plan?
Even if a court establishes a workable threshold for fee-only plans, no
matter where the court sets it, debtors will propose a plan that just barely
avoids qualifying as a fee-only plan, thereby avoiding the special
circumstances requirement. This highlights Janger’s prescription for using
muddy standards instead of bright-line rules where one expects abuse.333 Once
the rule becomes crystal clear, fee-only debtors will move up to, but not over,
the line of abuse. If, on the other hand, it is unclear exactly what constitutes a
fee-only plan, debtors remain subject to the court’s discretion. And that leads
to one of the primary benefits of a muddy standard: for the court to take
debtors as they come to bankruptcy, in light of all their circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Three circuit courts have made clear that a per se approach to fee-only
plans should not replace the totality of the circumstances standard for

333

Janger, supra note 308, at 601.
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determining good faith.334 By requiring debtors to justify fee-only plans
through special circumstances, one of those decisions, Puffer, adds some teeth
to the prevailing view that fee-only plans are usually bad faith.335
In light of the Puffer court’s shift to a more rigid rule, this Comment
conducted an empirical analysis of chapter 13 fee-only and low percentage
plans to shed light on the actual application of the current good faith standard.
The findings show that, even within the context of fee-only plans, which are
usually found to be in bad faith, courts are not always finding bad faith for the
same reasons. The study reveals that a court narrows its focus when finding
bad faith but not on any particular set of factors. Such a result may favor the
current totality of the circumstances standard.
This Comment, however, suggests Puffer strikes an appropriate balance
between retaining the subjective test and placing a heavier burden on the
debtor to justify a fee-only plan. This analysis makes a modest attempt to build
upon the discussion of good faith in chapter 13, as courts continue to wrestle
with balancing the debtor’s fresh start with a fair distribution to creditors. The
discussion might benefit from a further study of all chapter 13 good faith
litigation regardless of the amount of repayment to general unsecured creditors.
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334 Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2014); Puffer, 674 F.3d at 82; Sikes
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